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II 
Abstract (English) 
 
This thesis examines the efforts undertaken by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Regional Economic Community, which has been established on August 17, 1992, and 
which encompasses fifteen states of the Southern Africa region. While regional economic 
integration and economic growth remain a primary goal of the organization, the community also 
decided to commence an ambitious project of establishment of the regional peace and security 
architecture. The analysis of this architecture is a main focus of this thesis.  
 
Security cooperation has been given a special attention by the SADC, as it was very early recognized 
by the community that peace and security in the region constitute necessary preconditions for 
creation of conductive environment for sustainable socio-economic development. However, not 
infrequently the SADC comes under criticism as unable and unwilling to pursue its goal pertaining 
security in meaningful and effective manner. Analysis and reassessment of the state of security 
regime development reached by the SADC, as well as its effectiveness in fostering human security 
are in the center of this research. In other words, the aim of the master thesis is to determine what 
are deficiencies and achievements of the SADC’s security architecture in providing for stable peace 
in the region.  
 
The theoretical foundation of the research is derived from works of Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett on security communities. Further, changing paradigms on human security and human 
development are discussed as a point of reference to the SADC’s undertakings. The study gives an 
insight on the institutional structure of the SADC; provides a brief history of the organization; 
discusses aims and objectives of the community outlined it its documents; and elucidates its 
institutional structure. It also examines the community’s response to the ongoing conflicts and crises 
in the region.  
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
III 
Abstract (Deutsch)  
 
Diese Abschlussarbeit untersucht die Bemühungen der Südafrikanischen Entwicklungsgemeinschaft 
(SADC), die am 17. August 1992 gegründet wurde und 15 Staaten der südafrikanischen Region umfasst. 
Obwohl regionale wirtschaftliche Integration und Wirtschaftswachstum die Hauptziele der Organisation 
bleiben, entschied sich die Gemeinschaft auch für ein ambitioniertes Projekt zur Errichtung einer 
regionalen Architektur für Frieden und Sicherheit. Auf dieser soll das Hauptaugenmerk der Arbeit liegen. 
 
Der Sicherheitszusammenarbeit wurde besondere Aufmerksamkeit der SADC zuteil, da die 
Gemeinschaft sehr früh erkannte, dass Frieden und Sicherheit in der Region notwendige 
Grundbedingungen zur Schaffung eines Umfelds für nachhaltige sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung 
darstellen. Allerdings wird nicht selten kritisiert, dass die SADC unwillig und unfähig sei, ihre 
Sicherheitsziele effektiv zu verfolgen. Diese Arbeit wird sich auf die Analyse und Neubewertung des 
Standes der Entwicklung des SADC-Sicherheitsregimes konzentrieren, sowie auf ihre Effektivität 
„Menschliche Sicherheit“ zu fördern. Mit anderen Worten: Das Ziel der Masterarbeit ist es, Schwächen 
und Erfolge der von der SADC etablierten Sicherheitsarchitektur zur Schaffung von regionalem Frieden 
und Stabilität aufzudecken. 
 
Das theoretische Grundwerk der Arbeit ist von den Werken Emanuel Adlers und Michael Barnetts über 
Sicherheitsgemeinschaften abgeleitet. Ferner werden sich verändernde Paradigma zur Menschlichen 
Sicherheit und „Menschlichen Entwicklung“ als Bezugspunkt für die Unternehmungen der SADC 
diskutiert. Die Studie schafft Einsichten in die institutionelle Struktur der SADC, liefert eine knappe 
Geschichte der Organisation, diskutiert Ziele und Vorhaben, die die Gemeinschaft in ihren Dokumenten 
skizziert und analysiert die institutionelle Struktur im Detail. Zusätzlich untersucht der Aufsatz die 
Reaktionen der Gemeinschaft auf andauernde Konflikte und Krisen in der Region. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Background Information 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established on August 17, 1992 in 
Windhoek, where the Treaty of the SADC (SADC Treaty) was signed. The roots of the community, 
however, can be traced back to two organizations existing in the region beforehand. First, the 
Frontline States (FLS) alliance, was an informal forum of newly independent states1 with a main 
objective of a political liberation of apartheid in South Africa and termination of white rule in 
Rhodesia. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), in turn, focused 
on economical coordination with an ultimate aim of reducing the economic dependence of states in 
the region on South Africa (Cilliers, 1999, p. 4). With the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and 
the independence gained by Zimbabwe, motivation for the existence of both organizations changed. 
However, as profits from regional economic and security cooperation have been recognized by all 
Southern African nation states, and it was seen as desirable to sustain and strengthen this 
cooperation also in new political settings, old organizations have been transformed and incorporated 
into the SADC. 
 
Today, the SADC comprises of fifteen member states2 and is officially granted the status of the 
Regional Economic Community (REC) by the African Union (AU).3 While regional economic 
integration and economic growth are primary goals of the community, expressed in its founding 
                                                          
1 According to Cilliers, heads of states of Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique founded FLS in 1975. Angola joined 
FLS in 1976, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990, and South Africa in 1994, shortly before demise (Cilliers, 1999, p. 
4). 
2 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Madagascar has 
been suspended from the community since March 2009. Source: Official web page of SADC. 
3  In July 2006 at the seventh ordinary session of the AU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government  AU recognized 
eight RECs on the African Continent: The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), The Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC),  
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),  the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (Ruppel, 2009, p. 276). 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
2 
document the SADC Treaty,4 the community also incorporated other objectives into its agenda. 
Among others, the objectives enshrined in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty are: promotion of 
economic growth and development; alleviation of poverty; raising standards and quality of people’s 
rights; promotion of democracy; maintenance of peace, stability and security in the region; 
promotion of common values; harmonization of various economic strategies and programs; 
environmental protection; combating HIV/AIDS; and gender mainstreaming ([Art. 5 (a-k)], SADC 
Treaty).  
 
Above all, security cooperation has been given special attention by the SADC, as it was very early 
recognized by the community that peace and security in the region constitute necessary 
preconditions for the creation of a conductive environment for sustainable economic and social 
development. By incorporating security cooperation into its agenda, the SADC committed itself inter 
alia to the promotion of peace and stability in the region; protection of its people; promotion of 
democracy; observance of human rights; and prevention of intra and interstate conflicts and their 
settlement. ([Art. 2], 2001, SADC). To achieve those objectives the SADC commenced an ambitious 
development project of a peace and security architecture, of which many elements have already been 
well developed. It is important to mention that the SADC’s official documents pertaining security 
arrangements touch on both traditional security measures (which focus on enhancing military 
relations between states), as well as on human security (Hammerstad, 2005, p. 80), the concept, 
which will be explained in depth at the later stage of this thesis. 
 
1.2. Problem Statement  
Although Southern Africa has experienced many positive changes during the last two decades, due 
to developing very dynamically, and despite collective efforts of states to increase stability in the 
                                                          
4 SADC Treaty has been signed in 1992 and amended in August 2001. Source: SADC Official Webpage. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
3 
region, it is important to remember that the region is still hounded by many problems and remains 
very fragile in terms of economic and security perspectives.  
 
First of all, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an official member of the SADC since 1997, 
is widely recognized as exemplary failed state. Despite improvement of the situation in the DRC in 
last decade, armed groups still pose considerable threat to human security, and bring about 
instability in northern and eastern areas of the country. According to Human Rights Watch’s World 
Report 2012, there are nearly 1.7 million people displaced within the DRC borders, and 476,000 
refugees in neighboring countries. Tremendous numbers of displaced people gives rise to renewed 
concerns about the possibility of regionalization of the conflict. Angola, which emerged from a 
prolonged civil war only in 2002, also continuously experiences threats posed by insurgency groups, 
especially in the Cabinda region. To a large extent, the situation in Madagascar, which has been 
suspended from the SADC until constitutional order will be restored in the country after a military 
coup, also remains unstable and unpredictable. Moreover, reports by civil society groups and 
different NGOs on widespread political violence and oppression in Zimbabwe or Swaziland are not 
rare. Finally, human rights advocacy groups frequently indicate serious violations of basic human 
rights in many other states encompassed by the SADC.5  
 
Additionally, most of the SADC’s member states were ranked relatively low on the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in 2011. Out of 187 countries listed by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), the DRC is to be found at the very end of the list, followed by Mozambique, 
which has been placed as 184th and Zimbabwe being 173rd.  With exceptions of Mauritius (located as 
77th) and Seychelles (52nd), none of the SADC’s member states are located within the top 100 
countries.  
                                                          
5 For more details consult: Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2012 (HRW, 2012). 
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Additionally, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where prevalence of HIV and AIDS is the highest in 
the world. According to the UNAIDS fact sheet 68% (22.5 million) of all people who are infected 
by HIV live in that region (UNAIDS, 2010). In the countries that belong to the SADC, the 
estimated prevalence of HIV (excluding Seychelles and Democratic Republic of Congo) amounts to 
12.7 million people.  
 
All the factors mentioned above, pose a serious threat for both human and regional security and 
bring about a possibility of undermining stability in the region. Therefore, the success of the 
evolving SADC security regime depends on both the ability of the community to address and solve 
current and potential intra and interstate conflicts in a peaceful manner, as well as its ability to 
mitigate and effectively eliminate factors posing as threats to human security. 
 
As hinted at before, all of those challenges have been recognized by the SADC and addressed 
explicitly in its most important documents. In fact, as Hammerstad pointed out, “[o]n paper, SADC 
has finished setting up its security structures” (Hammerstad, 2005, p. 79). However, not infrequently 
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (henceforth: the Organ) – the SADC’s 
body responsible for coordination of member states’ activities in areas of politics, defence and 
security - comes under criticism as unable and unwilling to pursue its goal in meaningful and 
effective manner. Analysis of the state of security regime development reached by the SADC and its 
Organ in Southern African region, as well as its effectiveness in fostering human security are 
therefore worth deeper investigation. 
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1.3. Research Objective and Research Questions 
Inquires into and analysis of the SADC’s developing security architecture have been in the center of 
attention of many scholars since the organization came into existence. Among many important 
contributions, one should mention works of Laurie Nathan, Jakkie Cilliers, Naison Ngoma, Anne 
Hammerstad or Benedict Franke.6 Researchers’ opinions are divided to a large degree over the 
possible future trajectory of and perspectives for the SADC, and the question of whether the 
community has the capacity to become an adequate organization to provide sustainable solutions to 
regional challenges connected with stability, peace and security. Pointing out many institutional 
deficiencies, as well as economic, historical, cultural and social factors, most of scholars seem to 
belong to the ‘pessimistic camp’. 
 
Nevertheless, taking into consideration the dynamics with which the organization develops, as well 
as positive changes which occurred in the last couple of years in many of the SADC’s member 
states, this master thesis should be seen as an update on the current developments considering the 
SADC’s peace and security architecture, a re-assessment of the organization’s proceedings, and its 
capability to assure a secure environment in the region it encompasses. In other words, the aim of 
the master thesis is to determine what deficiencies and achievements of the SADC’s security 
architecture exist in providing for stability and peace in the region. 
 
To this end, this thesis is guided by following research questions:  
(Q1) What specific frameworks and mechanisms have been developed by the community to prevent 
and solve intra and interstate conflicts; promote democracy; human rights and the rule of law; 
and foster human security in Southern Africa? 
                                                          
6 Specific contributions of those authors are to be find in the bibliography. 
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(Q2) What are possible factors that limit the security integration arrangements within the SADC? 
What are the main challenges for the SADC concerning the creation of an effective security 
architecture?  
(Q3) How does the SADC respond to conflicts and crises taking place within its region? Are the 
community’s responses consistent with its own norms, values and principles enshrined in its 
documents? What are the SADC’s responses to violations of human rights and insecurity 
stemming from internal instability of its member states? 
(Q4) What are the specific achievements of the SADC in general, and particularly its Organ since its 
creation, in attaining the level of the regional integration anticipated by the concept of 
pluralistic security community? Is the SADC upholding its own objectives and principles, 
which have the potential to guide the organization toward becoming security community? 
 
In this  study, the concept of a ‘pluralistic security community’, as well as rationale for its utilization, 
will be explained in detail in the theoretical part of the paper. 
 
1.4. Methodology 
This research deploys a case study as a main research strategy, which is intended to be qualitative in 
nature, and which has descriptive and explanatory purposes. Robert K. Yin sees the strength of case 
study research as it allows the researcher “to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events” in order to “understand complex social phenomena” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). He suggests 
deploying a case study as a research strategy in situations when the researcher has little or no control 
over events, and when the focus of the study is “on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1) that conforms with the case in question. The scholar also emphasizes 
the fact that a case study allows for a wide choice of research methods to be applied.  
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The main unit of analysis – the SADC - comprises of fifteen nation states7 located in Southern and 
Central Africa, together with Madagascar and the Seychelles. My main point of interest is the 
analysis of the organization, its policy and outcomes of its policies connected with common security 
arrangements. While my case study seems to constitute a holistic unit of analysis (the SADC as an 
organization), I am aware of individual states’ impact on policy formulation and their bargaining 
power within the SADC, as they are often translated to and expressed as a common organizational 
agenda. Therefore, this study will look not only at the final outcomes of the SADC policies 
pertaining to security arrangements, but also toward the process of constructing and negotiating 
them through different actors where it is relevant.   
 
1.5. Data collection 
In order to collect data relevant to addressing the research questions posed in this study, I examine 
already existing literature connected with my topic. Additionally, I analyze official documents issued 
by the SADC that are made public on establishment of various institutions, their operationalization, 
and overall activity of the community in the areas related to politics, peace and security. The 
research is further complemented by reports of various civil society groups active in the region. By 
doing this, I intend to reveal the trajectory along which the SADC’s security arrangements have been 
developing in the past, unveil its aims and objectives, as well as cast some light on its most recent 
developments. However, it has to be noted, that the research on the SADC’s peace and security 
architecture appears constricted. This is due to the SADC’s leaders labelling most of the issues 
connected with security arrangements as highly confidential. As noted by Laurie Nathan - the 
scholar who had an opportunity to gain personal insight into the SADC’s undertakings to establish a 
security regime - many documents issued by the organization are ‘bleached’ due to the SADC’s 
sensitivity regarding confidentiality and therefore do not mirror the full dynamics within the 
                                                          
7 Including suspended Madagascar. 
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organization (Nathan, 2006, p. 607). Moreover, due to the very structure of the organization, which 
comprises of key decision-makers of the region, arranging interviews with them turned out to be a 
very difficult and time consuming enterprise. As a consequence, initially planned interviews had to 
be dropped in favor of more in-depth documents and literature analysis. Official websites relating to 
different elements of the organization’s structure also constitute an important source of materials for 
analysis. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
This master thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter introduces the topic, presents a research 
objective and research questions, and discusses shortly the methodology and methods of data 
collection. Chapter Two provides clarifications on the concepts and theories to which this study 
refers in the subsequent chapters. More specifically, it discusses the notion of security and 
development, focusing especially on human security and human development respectively, as well as 
the concept of the security community introduced by Karl Deutsch and developed further by 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Chapter Three analyzes changes taking place on the global and 
regional level affecting the internalization of the new norms connected with security by the 
international community. It mainly focuses on internalization and institutionalization of the notions 
of responsibility to protect (R2P) and human security. Chapter Four, in turn, opens up the empirical 
part of the study by giving an insight to the institutional structure of the SADC. It also provides a 
brief history of the organization and discusses aims and objectives of the community outlined in its 
documents. Chapter Five takes a deeper insight into the peace and security architecture developed 
by the SADC and discusses its strengths and weaknesses. Chapter Six focuses on the practical side 
of the SADC’s security architecture, by examining the community’s response to the ongoing 
conflicts and crises in the region. It allows for analysis of the SADC’s security architecture 
effectiveness and shortcomings. Finally, Chapter Seven provides a conclusion of the study.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter aims to providing a clarification of several concepts and theories, to which this study 
will be referring to in the next chapters. Clarification on how different concepts and theories are to 
be interpreted is a necessary step, if one wishes to avoid misunderstandings and create common 
ground for successful transfer of ideas. As David A. Baldwin puts it: “without clear concepts (…) 
scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy-makers find it difficult to distinguish between 
alternative policies” (1997, p. 6). In the following subchapters, I firstly provide a very brief overview 
on how an understanding of the concept of security underwent conceptual revisions during the last 
decades with a special focus on the concept of human security. Thereafter, I shortly elaborate on a 
notion of development, concentrating mainly on a concept of human development. Finally, I 
introduce the concept of security communities developed by two scholars - Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett – who resurrected Karl Deutsch’s ideas on emergence of regional zones of stable 
peace.  
 
 
2.1. The Notion of Security: Towards Human Security 
From a realist’s approach to international relations, the state is considered to be the main and most 
important actor of the international arena, which has to struggle for its integrity and survival in 
generally hostile environment (Ngoma, 2004a). Realism gives priority to national interests, which 
means survival of the state in an anarchic environment, above concerns pertaining to morality; the 
end justifies the means. Therefore, constant reinforcement of military strength to keep a balance of 
power is considered as the key to success of every state. In this approach, security is equated with 
national security and can be assured only by the military strength of the state, which will be capable 
to effectively protect itself from external threats. Only if state security is assured, the development of 
the state may occur. Ken Booth, critic of the realistic approach, postulates that not infrequently the 
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concept of “national security” serves for many authoritarian regimes as “a cloak for state 
oppression” (1991, p. 317).  
 
International Relations’ liberals, similarly to realists, still see the nation-state as the main actor, 
however recognizing the increasing significance of non-state actors in world politics. This approach 
assumes the rationality of human beings, who are eager to cooperate in order to attain common aims 
– harmony and collective security. As John H. Herz aptly grasps it: “Idealist (…) tends to 
concentrate on conditions and solutions which are supposed to overcome the egoistic instincts and 
attitudes of individuals and groups in favor of considerations beyond mere security and self-interest” 
(1950, p. 158). Therefore, concepts of sovereignty, national security, and the power of authority, 
which are at the core of the realist school, have been considerably undermined and replaced by the 
idea of collective security.  
 
A need for a new approach to security has been gradually recognized after the end of the Cold War 
and further emphasized after 9/11. As global interdependence and interconnectedness advanced, 
former state-centric approaches failed to include non-conventional challenges to security. It became 
apparent that: “rather than originating from rival states, the origin of contemporary security threats 
is either non-state (domestic or transnational), or, in a different conception, the state poses a threat 
to its citizens. Military conflicts result primary from problems of domestic legitimacy” (Miller, 2001, 
p. 19). The need to redefine the notion of security was already first comprehended and voiced in 
1983 by Richard Ullman (Miller, 2001, p. 20).  
 
Challenges which have elevated on the security agenda include both terrorism and organized crimes, 
which cause a direct threat, but encompass also infectious diseases, poverty, climate change, food 
insecurity, environmental problems, and more that can lead to resentment among societies and, as a 
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result, indirectly exacerbate conflicts. To address those threats effectively, human security had to be 
raised on the agenda as the priority. This shift of thinking was explicitly pronounced in the Human 
Development Report published in 1994 by UNDP entitled New Dimensions of Human Security. The 
Report states that “we need (…) profound transition in thinking – from nuclear security to human 
security” as the old paradigms have neglected “legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives” (HDR, 1994, p. 22). This report defined several components which pose 
a threat to human security: economic security (unemployment leading in many cases to poverty and 
homelessness), food security (availability of food which prevents undernourishment and hunger), 
health security (infectious diseases, limited access to the health care in poor countries), 
environmental security (environmental catastrophes, soil degradation, water pollution), personal 
security (war, physical violence, crime, domestic violence, torture), community security (tension 
arising between or within different groups, i.e. ethnic or religious groups) and political security (state 
repressions, human rights violations) (ibid., pp. 24-33). In short, adherents of human security 
approach put individuals, not states, at the center of attention and as referent objects of security 
(Kaldor, 2007, pp. 182-197; Owen & Liotta, 2006, p. 37). 
 
Nevertheless, critics of the human security approach not infrequently point out, that due to the all-
inclusive nature and flexibility of the concept it becomes so broad that it often results in being 
meaningless and analytically useless. For instance, some scholars argue that “labeling all potential 
harms to the individual [as] security threats makes prioritizing political action impossible” (Owen, 
2004, pp. 378-379). Debate on whether and how to narrow down the human security concept, 
resulted in a significant split among scholars and policy makers8. One group advocates broad 
understanding of the concept, emphasizing mainly the importance of ‘freedom from want’ aspect, 
                                                          
8 It should be noted however, that various scholars interested in the human security approach tend to give priority to 
different subcategories of human security. Therefore, the debate is not strictly polarized between narrow-broad 
definitions, but rather various definitions of the concept tend to be supportive of one or the other side of the 
spectrum. (Owen & Liotta, 2006, p. 50).  
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while proponents of a narrower approach focus on ‘freedom from fear’ component (Owen & 
Liotta, 2006, p. 41). The previously mentioned Human Development Report 1994, which identifies 
seven different subcategories of human security, is often referred to as the conceptual basis for 
broad understanding of human security (ibid., p.41). Proponents of this approach argue that the 
decision to shift referent object of security to the individual, automatically involves the need for 
inclusion of broad range of threats to human beings. 
 
The narrower conception (termed also as ‘Canadian Approach’), in turn, concentrates “on 
protecting individuals and communities from violence” (Human Security Report 2005 quoted in: 
Owen & Liotta, 2006, p. 43) and “emphasizes the more immediate necessity for intervention 
capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure 
development” (Owen & Liotta, 2006, p. 43). In other words, the narrower approach to human 
security to a large extent dissociates itself from developmental and environmental elements, which 
the broader definition embraces. The decision not to include those aspects into the narrower 
approach is mainly justified by pragmatic reasons of policy-making.  
 
Despite the advocates of human security encountering many problems when trying to formulate an 
exact definition of the concept, and deciding which subcategories to include and which to exclude, 
there are certain elements common to both narrow and broad conceptions that distinguish human 
security from traditional security formulated by liberalists and realists scholars. The first element, 
already discussed, is the focus on the individual as a referent object of security. Second, both the 
broad and narrow approach to human security “rely on noncoercive methods” such as “security 
sector reform, sustainable economic development, preventive diplomacy, post-conflict statebuilding 
and mediation, and negotiation efforts” (Owen & Liotta, 2006, p. 43).  
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Taylor Owen notes that in spite of all the seven subcategories of human security being equally 
important, it is unfeasible due to pragmatic reasons, to be given the same priority by policy-makers. 
Rather, threats to human security should be ordered according to their severity in a given region and 
time, as well as political will and capability to address them (Owen, 2004, pp. 381-384).  
 
While recognizing the importance of all the seven components of human security encapsulated in 
the UNDP report, this master thesis deploys the narrower approach to human security, with special 
focus on personal and political security. It has been chosen for several reasons. First of all, the 
inclusive analysis of all of the seven components of the human security would require in-depth 
examination of many separate programs of the SADC (for example those  addressing food 
production and food security, agriculture, sustainable farming, natural resources, eradication of 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases, etc.). Secondly, the decision to focus mainly 
on personal and political security eventuate from the very institutional structure of the community: 
while the ‘proper’ SADC is responsible for ensuring human security through economic and 
development programs, the Organ, which is a separate body (but still accountable to the ‘proper’ 
SADC), is responsible for assuring the cooperation in areas relating to collective security and 
defence, public and state security, as well as politics. Finally, while personal and political security are 
not sufficient conditions for achieving sustainable human security, it arguably constitutes an enabling 
condition for the other aspects of human security to develop. One can multiply examples of 
situations when interstate conflict, civil war, or internal instability of a state hindered its economic 
development (economic security), led to significant ecological disasters (environmental security), and 
caused the collapse of health systems (health security). While all those elements are intertwined with 
each other, the empirical evidence suggests personal and political security are of particular 
importance.  
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The notion of security used and applied by the SADC is however rather problematic to define and 
delineate. As already mentioned, the most important documents of the community (see: Chapter 
5.2) clearly indicate, that the ultimate aim of the community’s activity is a protection of the human 
security, as it is widely understood, to the citizens of the region. The SADC wants to reach this goal, 
on the one hand through economic integration, and on the other, through political, diplomatic, and 
military cooperation coordinated mainly through its Organ. Nonetheless, as it is shown in this thesis, 
despite its commitment on paper to values such as human rights, rule of law and democracy, which 
are inherent to the notion of human security and which, in theory, should lie in the heart of the 
SADC’s activities, the organization not infrequently grants them cursory treatment (Kaime, 2004). 
Paulino Macaringue and Shirley Magano argue this case, as “Different states [in the SADC region] 
still view and articulate security in divergent ways. (…) The human security notion, although 
embedded in the key SADC policy documents, is still far from being the foundation of a regional 
practice” (2008, p. 135). Therefore, one needs to remain aware of those ambiguities in theoretical 
and practical approaches of the SADC to the notion of security, while analyzing the community. 
 
2.2. The Notion of Development: Toward Human Development 
The notion of development, similar to the one of security, underwent significant conceptual 
modifications during the last two decades. Until 1990s, when the first Human Development Report 
(HDR) introduced the alternative approach to development – human development, two other 
paradigms of development dominated the scene. Namely, basic needs and neo-liberal approaches 
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p. 311).   
 
The basic need approach has been the first “operational and intellectually coherent vision of a 
people-focused development strategy” (UNIHP, Briefing Note No. 8, 2009, p. 1). It advocates 
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protection of people’s well-being through providing those in need with a set of basic goods and 
services, which can assure them a decent level of life. “Basic needs may be interpreted in terms of 
minimum specified quantities of such things as food, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation that are 
necessary to prevent ill health, undernourishment, and the like” (Streeten et al. 1981, p. 25, quoted in 
Santos et al., 2010, p. 2).  
 
Despite the basic need approach being people-centered, it has been widely criticized for focusing on 
providing merely goods and services to people, instead of increasing their capabilities. In other words, 
people were rather considered to constitute the object of development, than being active actors in 
the whole process. Fukuda-Parr also points out the fact that the basic need approach, aims merely at 
“meeting people’s material needs” and largely ignores aspects such as “human rights, freedoms, and 
agency emphasized in the human development approach” (2003, p. 304). The main reason for the 
basic needs approach’s demise is discerned in a global change of economic policies, which largely 
neglected social concerns and brought to the fore neo-liberal policies. In more specific terms, the 
change in approach to development was caused by “a return to economic orthodoxy, which was 
driven by three factors: the rise of Thatcherism and Reaganism in developed countries, the onset of 
world recession, and banking policies designed to ensure that developing countries repaid their 
debts” (UNIHP, Briefing Note No. 8, 2009, p. 1).  
 
The neo-liberal approach to development dramatically shifted the focus from individuals and 
collectives to economic growth, because of “belief that economic indicators were and ought to be at 
the core of development” (UNIHP, Briefing Note No. 8, 2009, p. 3). Economic growth was, and to 
large extent is, perceived as a main source of people’s well-being and prosperity, and by extension is 
perceived to be able to ensure a stable and peaceful environment. The criticism directed toward the 
neo-liberal approach to development has concentrated around arguments that it neglects the “rights, 
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freedoms and human agency” (Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p. 304) of ordinary people.  It is argued that 
economic indicators may be useful in measuring economic development, but economic 
development understood in this context does not necessarily guarantee improvement of life-
conditions for societies. The rise of economic indicators may even obscure the real situation within 
society: inequality among individuals, degradation of environment, or prevalence of devastating 
communicable diseases, which in the longer-term, will inevitably leave a severe imprint on economy. 
Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, authors of erstwhile quoted UNIHP Briefing 
Note, indeed argue that “In the last few years, economic research has made clear that the cost of 
these [neo-liberal] policies was high in terms of their negative effects on economic growth and 
education, health, and other social services” (UNIHP, Briefing Note No. 8, 2009, p. 4). 
 
With the recognition that development needs to be measured in a more holistic way and not only 
though economic lenses, scholars became preoccupied with putting human beings back to the center 
of developmental agenda. In 1990, the first Human Development Report was published, introducing 
the concept of human development. This approach does not reject completely the importance of 
economic development and growth, but it states that increased income should be interpreted as a 
means to achieve certain outcomes, and not as an end in itself. The end of development should be 
people’s well-being, and economic growth is necessary but not sufficient element to achieve this 
aim. It also pointed out, that certain human needs cannot be satisfied simply by increased income: 
 
“ (…) people often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, 
in higher measured income or growth figures: better nutrition and health services, 
greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods, better working conditions, 
security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, and a sense of 
participating in the economic, cultural and political activities of their communities. Of 
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course, people also want higher incomes as one of their options. But income is not the 
sum total of human life” (HDR, 1990, p. 9). 
 
Inferring from premises mentioned above, the report defined human development as “a process of 
enlarging people's choices” (ibid. p. 10). The foundations of this paradigm are to be found in 
Amartya Sen’s work, who saw human development as expansion of people’s “functionings and 
capabilities to function, the range of things that a person could do and be in her life”9 (Sen, 1989 
quoted in Fukuda-Parr, 2003, p. 303). HDR in 1990 identified three of the most important ‘choices’ 
which people should be able to achieve: “to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to 
have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living” (HDR, 1990, p. 10). The report 
recognizes that this list is not exhaustive and other elements may gain prominence in the future, but 
it states that “If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain 
inaccessible” 10 (ibid., p. 10). 
 
Lars Buur et al. notice that development in its new understanding tends to embrace a wider 
spectrum of ‘responsibilities’, especially “[it] is being charged with the responsibility of enhancing 
security and non-violent forms of behaviour at all levels of society” (Buur et al., 2007, p. 10). As a 
result of all those conceptual modifications, the notion of development when used in various 
discourses may carry different meanings and as a result, involve different policies. It is important 
therefore to recognize what kind of development one conceives, especially given the neoliberal 
conception of development is still omnipresent, as human development only began gaining 
prominence in last decade, particularly among decision-makers. A better understanding of the 
                                                          
9 Fukuda-Parr notices that the original term which has been used by Sen - “capabilities” - has been replaced in HDR 
1990 with the one of “choices”, causing confusion due to a lack of its terminological clarity in this context. (2003, p. 
315, footnote 1). 
10 Additional choices, mentioned in the report, encompassed human rights, political freedom and personal self-respect. 
(HDR, 1990). Definition of human development later included other development characteristics. For example in a 
HDR from 2001 ‘participation in a life of a community’ has been added and HDR from 1995 put more emphasis on 
issues connected with gender. 
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conceptualizations of different modes of development will help to apprehend which paradigm is 
hegemonic in the SADC , and for what reasons and with what results. 
 
2.3. The Concept of Security Communities 
By reading closely the objectives of the SADC encapsulated in its Treaty and other documents 
issued by the community, one can conclude that the most desired model for the SADC’s integration 
would be the creation of the pluralistic security community. The concept of a security community 
was introduced by Richard Van Waegen in 1950s, given theoretical and empirical background by 
Karl Deutsch in 1957 (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 6), but gained prominence only in 1998 when it had 
been resurrected by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The concept entertains an idea of the 
eradication of insecurities in certain regions through increasing mutual trust between actors and the 
development of shared identities among them, which results in the creation of zones of stable peace. 
 
Deutsch et al define a security community as a group of people, who reach such a level of 
integration, which assures that “the members of that community will not fight each other physically, 
but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 5). Deutsch makes the 
distinction between two types of security communities. The first one, amalgamated, exists when there 
is a “formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some 
type of common government after amalgamation” (Deutsch et al, 1957, p. 6). The second type – 
pluralistic security communities – does not require full renunciation of a state’s sovereignty to a 
supranational body. In the words of Adler and Barnett: “[S]tates within a pluralistic security 
community possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and mutual 
responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-ness’, and are integrated to 
the point that they entertain ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’” (1998, p.7). Therefore, a 
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pluralistic security community is defined by the scholars as “a transnational region comprised of 
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (ibid. p. 30).  
 
While the emergence of the first type of security community is (currently) highly improbable in 
Southern Africa11, the second one highly matches the final stage which the SADC wants to attain12 – 
a peaceful environment in which conflicts are solved not though military means but peaceful ones, 
and where mutual trust and shared values ensure smooth economic and security cooperation 
between the SADC’s member states.   
 
The concept of security communities builds on the assumption that the same processes that led to 
the creation of states may be equally relevant for the development of integration between bigger 
units. Among the factors which advance this process - transactions – one can mention “trade, 
migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, use of physical communication facilities” 
(Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 7). Arguably, the interstate cooperation aiming at the establishment of a 
regional security regime – as it is in case of the SADC – should be counted among those factors. 
Those forms of communication enhance mutual reciprocity, help to build trust among states, and 
leads to the discovery of common interests and identities (ibid. p., 14). 
 
At this point, it is necessary to justify why the concept of security communities has been chosen to 
be deployed in this thesis. Firstly, as has already been mentioned from the analysis of the SADC 
                                                          
11 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett also give more attention to pluralistic communities, as they argue “that it is 
theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and 
international relations theory” (1998, p. 5). 
12 This conclusion has been inferred from analysis of two documents: SADC Treaty and Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Cooperation. For example the Preamble of the Protocol states two objectives, which point out the willingness of 
states to attain such a level of integration, which is in accordance with a concept of security communities: 
“DETERMINED to achieve solidarity, peace and security in the Region through close cooperation on matters of 
politics, defence and security; DESIROUS TO ENSURE that close cooperation on matters of politics, defence and 
security shall at all times promote the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or 
arbitration” (Protocol on Politics, Defence and Cooperation, Preamble) 
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documents, it appears that this is the intended direction in which the community wishes to develop. 
Secondly, many other concepts and theories that consider the possibility of the creation of regional 
stable peace zones perceive democracy as a necessary condition for its development. States 
encompassed by the SADC however are frequently described as non-democratic, or as paying a lip 
service only to democratic values.  
 
The concept of democratic peace, for example, in its ‘purest’ form holds that democratic nations do 
not fight with each other, or, in a less idealistic approach, fight less. Azar Gat remarks that studies 
on democratic peace theory reveal that not only a positive correlation exists between peacefulness’ 
of the state and its regime (democracy), but also interconnectedness between states plays a role (Gat, 
2006). This interconnectedness is attained mainly through open and mutual trade and membership 
in international organizations. Those three elements – extensive trade, active participation of 
international organizations, and the type of state’s regime – influence states’ behavior independently, 
and constitute the so-called Kantian ‘tripod of peace’ (ibid. p. 586). Although many common 
elements are discerned between the security community concept and the one of democratic peace, 
lack of democracy in the SADC region implies deployment of the Deutsch’s concept. As Adler and 
Barnett argue, the development of a security community in a non-democratic context is indeed 
possible, with Southeast Asia being one of the identifiable examples (1998, p. 16).  
 
2.4. Adler and Barnett’s Framework for the Study of Security Communities13  
This subchapter briefly summarizes Adler and Barnett’s conceptualizations and findings, in order to 
provide a better understanding of the concept of security community and in the next step, be able to 
                                                          
13 This subchapter draws heavily on Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s concept of ‘security community’ and their 
ideas for its operationalization (see: Adler, E., Barnett, M. (1998) Security Communities. Part I, pp. 1 – 65). 
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analyze the development of security architecture in the SADC’s region through the prism of the 
concept explained.  
 
Adler and Barnett, basing on works of Karl Deutsch and aiming on correcting shortcomings of his 
conceptualization, attempt to provide a comprehensive framework for studying security 
communities. To this end, scholars firstly focus on conceptual vocabulary, which is deemed to be 
important for studying security communities. They provide definitions of key concepts critical for 
studying security communities, as they accurately recognize that many of them tend to be vague or 
baffling. Secondly, conditions under which the development of a security community is possible are 
discussed. Those conditions are divided by Adler and Barnett into so-called three ‘tiers’. Finally, they 
describe the process of development of security communities: by focusing on visible evidence of the 
formation of security communities, they distinguish three phases of its development: 1) nascent, 2) 
ascendant, and 3) mature. 
 
In its conceptualization, Adler and Barnett start with defining a concept of a community by pointing 
to its three characteristics: 1) members of a given community exhibit shared values, meanings and 
identities as those features have a uniting quality, 2) relations between community members have 
multi-dimensional character (various areas and levels of cooperation), and 3) reciprocity between 
community members has a long-term disposition (1998, p. 31). Notwithstanding, Adler and Barnett 
emphasize the fact which is often ignored by other scholars, that cooperation between member 
states of a community is still to a great extent lead by the self-interest of states. This situation inevitably 
leads to an emergence of conflict situations of different scales. What is, however, specific for states, 
which are within a security community is the fact that despite the conflicts of interests being ever-
present, they are confident that the very conflicts will be solved without resorting to military means 
and violence in general: 
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“(…) while states within a security community are likely to exhibit rivalry and other 
interactive interactions associated with mixed-motive games, they no longer fear the use 
of violence as means of statecraft and to settle their disputes” (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 
32). 
 
Subsequently, Adler and Barnett move to explain the next conceptual element of the security 
community’s definition, namely, ‘peaceful change’: 
 
“Peaceful change can be best defined as neither the expectation of nor the preparation 
for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes (Adler & Barnett, 1998, 
p. 34) 
 
The scholars stress this situation may take place without any formal agreement or alliances between 
members of a community (ibid. p. 35). However it is more likely to emerge between states which are 
bounded by some kind of security arrangements (ibid. p. 52). 
 
Another issue addressed by the two authors is the question of dissolution of sovereignty under 
conditions of a security community. In formal terms, states within a security community retain their 
sovereign status. However, those states at the same time become agents of the community, which 
puts upon them under new obligations, rights and duties, and obliges them to act in accordance with 
norms prevalent within the community. As Adler aptly puts it: 
 
“(…) states can express their agency insofar as they meet and reproduce the epistemic 
and normative expectations of the community. States remain ‘free agents’, acting on the 
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basis of their own preferences, as long as these preferences are cognitively framed by 
the shared understandings of the community” (Adler, 1997, p. 266 quoted in Adler & 
Barnett, 1998, p. 37). 
 
In the second part, as already mentioned, Adler and Barnett move on to determine factors which 
contribute to the emergence of a security community, and systematize them into three ‘tiers’. The 
first tier - precipitating conditions for development of security community – refers to different push 
and pull factors (i.e. emergence of common threat, changes in social reality, migrations, changes in 
environments etc.) which motivate states to cooperate with each other, as they recognize benefits of 
combined efforts in addressing various issues. What is important at this stage is increased 
communication and interaction between actors, which in the next phase lead to strengthening of 
mutual trust. Tier two is defined by Adler and Barnett as the stage at which “states and their peoples 
have become involved in a series of social interactions that have begun to transform the 
environment in which they are embedded” (ibid. p. 39). At this stage, mutual trust among members 
is increasing and collective identity is being formed. The scholars emphasize the crucial influence 
and role of 1) international organizations, 2) intensified transactions and communication occurring 
between actors, as well as 3) importance of social learning14 for the emergence of shared identities, 
meanings, values, and norms among actors. Finally, third tier describes the phase when already 
existent mutual trust and collective identity eradicates the security dilemma, allowing for the 
development of expectations of peaceful change. In the end, a security community is being formed.  
 
The last addition to Deutsch’s concept of security community by Adler and Barnett pertains to the 
conceptualization of “three stylized phases in the development of a security community” (ibid. p. 
                                                          
14Social learning has been defined as „active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality – what people consider   
real, possible and desirable – on the basis of new casual and normative knowledge”(Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 43).  
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48). Namely, ‘nascent’, ‘ascendant’, and ‘mature’. All those phases should be perceived as being 
somehow flexible, as not every developing security community necessarily needs to exhibit all of the 
indicators envisaged by the scholars for respective phases of community development. In the words 
of the concept’s authors: “These phases are intended as heuristic devices rather than uncomfortable 
teleological exercises” (ibid. p. 48). Different possible variations in the development of security 
communities are also justified by Adler and Barnett, by the fact, that they see the development of 
any community as path dependent: any small event and decision, which took place in the past, can 
have meaningful outcomes in the future. Additionally, the variety of available choices for each 
respective actor in a given time is limited by decisions made in the past. Finally, the costs of change 
of previously taken decision are increasing over time, so that every ‘step back’ is more problematic. 
Therefore, taking into account the multiplicity of factors which lead to the emergence of a security 
community and the fact that they “evolve from path dependent processes, their origins and paths 
will vary considerably” (ibid. p. 49). Nonetheless, the authors take an effort to specify some 
characteristics and mechanisms which, according to their judgment, are symptomatic for the process 
of security community development. 
 
In the first phase – ‘nascent’ - governments or states’ elites start taking into account the possibility 
of cooperation with other states to attain goals dictated by their self-interest. Among the gains from 
collaboration, one may mention: enhancement of mutual security, increase of trade, gains from 
economies of scale, increases of capability in addressing interstate threats, etc. “What matters is that 
they recognize or discover that they have joint interest that require collective action, and can 
mutually benefit from some modest coordination of security policies” (ibid. p. 50). Cooperation, 
therefore, results heavily from self-interest of states, not shared identities, and is triggered by 
different normative and material factors. Organizations established in order to coordinate 
cooperation at this stage have a capability to enhance communication and trust between actors.  
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The second phase – “ascendant” – is defined by Adler and Barnett as: 
 
“(…) increasingly dense networks; new institutions and organizations that reflect either 
tighter military coordination and co-operation and/or decreased fear that the other 
represents a threat; cognitive structures that promote ‘seeing’ and acting together and, 
therefore, the deepening of the level of mutual trust, and the emergence of collective 
identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change.” (Adler 
& Barnett, 1998, p. 53). 
 
This phase is characterized by extension of already existing networks and creation of new ones, as 
well as by intensification of communication and cooperation in various areas, which takes place not 
only at the level of governments and states’ elites.  The authors argue that at this phase of security 
community development, states may also increase cooperation in security sector, especially militarily. 
This again is translated into deepening of reciprocity, mutual trust, and gradual creation of shared 
identities.  
 
The last phase – “maturity” – refers to the stage, when dependable expectations of peaceful change 
are already existent: collective identity has been developed among actors. The scholars point to two 
possible variants of fully fledged security communities: loosely and tightly coupled. The former 
“observe the minimal definitional properties [of a security community] and no more” and are 
defined as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable 
expectation of peaceful change” (ibid. p. 30), while tightly coupled variants develop a system of 
mutual aid and “possess the system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a 
regional, centralized government; that is, it is something of post-sovereign system, endowed with 
common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of collective security 
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systems” (ibid. p. 30). Adler and Barnett point out some characteristics of mature security 
communities (both tightly and loosely coupled), which are: multilateralism, unfortified border, shifts 
in military planning, common definition of threat and shared discourse and language of the 
community (ibid. pp. 55-56). Moreover, indicators for tightly coupled communities encompass: 
cooperative and collective security, high level of military integration, coordination of the policies 
against perceived threat, and a free movement of populations. (ibid. 56-57).  
 
Theoretical considerations provided by Karl Deutsch and developed by Adler and Barnett allow for 
detailed analysis of the level of a region’s security integration. Assuming that states encompassed by 
the SADC unequivocally aim at the development of a pluralistic security community – as it is 
indicated in the SADC Treaty - the framework developed by the two scholars, which have been 
discussed in this subchapter, allows for an insight into the current level of the SADC’s member 
states integration and future prospects for its deepening. 
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Chapter Three: Security Integration in Southern Africa in a Wider Perspective 
Security integration and efforts to establish peace and security architecture on the sub-regional level 
by the SADC cannot be analyzed without reference to the changes that are taking place in wider 
continental and global contexts. The institutionalization and internalization of new norms, 
principles, and values at a global and continental level, which in many instances are responsible for a 
gradual change in the behaviors of the actors, as well as for the establishment of new institutions, 
should be taken into account. The change in understanding in concepts of security and 
development, and its implication for a (possible) change in global politics has already been discussed 
in the theoretical chapter. The following chapter, in turn, focuses more on the institutionalization 
and internalization by the United Nations (global level) and the AU (continental level) of new norms 
pertaining to security issues in order to provide a background for the developments that are taking 
place within the SADC. Specifically, this chapter looks into how the security culture on global and 
continental levels has changed during the last decades and in what way this could have shaped 
dynamics within the SADC. Security culture has been defined by Paul D. Williams as:  
 
“(…) patterns of thought and argumentation that establish pervasive and durable 
security preferences by formulating concepts of the role, legitimacy and efficacy of 
particular approaches to protecting values. Through a process of socialization, security 
cultures help establish the core assumptions, beliefs and values of decision-makers 
about how security challenges can and should be dealt with” (2007, p. 256).  
 
This chapter aims at providing a general background in order to understand the context in which the 
changing dynamics of the SADC are taking place.  
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3.1. Security Culture at the Global Level: New Norms at the UN 
The United Nations can be considered as one of the most prominent world actors, which has the 
power and capability to conceive, articulate, and disseminate new norms pertaining to many 
different levels of politics, economy, security etc. Shaun Breslin, for example, argues that “The UN 
has published and endorsed some of the most explicit calls for the establishment of new norms of 
global governance based on liberal conceptions of the best way of constructing a peaceful and 
prosperous global order” (2007, p. 194). The author as an example points out that the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been probably one of first and the most ambitious 
steps in the establishment and dissemination of new norms by the organization, which were 
supposed to be embraced universally by all nations around the world (ibid.).  
 
The Charter of the UN (hereafter: the UN Charter) since its inception has been guided by values 
such as: respect for human rights, people’s dignity and their equality and people’s right to social and 
economic advancement. At the level of inter-state relations and security arrangements the UN 
Charter invoked the principle of sovereign equality of all nation states, peaceful settlement of 
conflicts, good neighborhood and tolerance, all aiming at strengthening and maintaining 
international peace and security.  
 
However, it has been widely acknowledged that the sanctity of principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention into states’ internal affairs (as well as veto power of five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) who frequently used it to secure their political interests), in 
many cases have significantly paralyzed the activities of the UNSC in the areas pertaining 
maintenance to peace and security. The organization remained helpless and has been deprived of 
right (and will) to act when faced with gross violations of human rights and humanitarian 
catastrophes.  The reluctance of the organization to act was (and still is in many instances) evident 
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especially in cases when atrocities were performed within a territory of a state by authorities on its 
own citizens. A report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) entitled The Responsibility to Protect points out that the reasons for this situation lied in the very 
nature of the UN of that time:  
 
“Membership of the United Nations was the final symbol of independent sovereign 
statehood and thus the seal of acceptance into the community of nations. The UN also 
became the principal international forum for collaborative action in the shared pursuit 
of the three goals of state building, nation building and economic development. The 
UN was therefore the main arena for the jealous protection, not the casual abrogation, 
of state sovereignty.” (2001, p. 13).  
 
Sovereignty and the principle of non-interference into states’ internal affairs, however, started to be 
gradually challenged by new, emerging norms and concepts, among which the most important to 
mention are human rights, human security, human development and responsibility to protect.. As 
report by the ICISS points out, the gradual change of norms and behavior of international actors has 
been generated also by other factors. Namely, new challenges to security and the emergence of new 
actors who advocate vigorously for human rights protection and widening the concept of security:  
 
“The issues and preoccupations of the 21st century present new and often 
fundamentally different types of challenges from those that faced the world in 1945, 
when the United Nations was founded. As new realities and challenges have emerged, 
so too have new expectations for action and new standards of conduct in national and 
international affairs. (…).  
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The current debate on intervention for human protection purposes is itself both a 
product and a reflection of how much has changed since the UN was established. The 
current debate takes place in the context of a broadly expanded range of state, non-state, 
and institutional actors, and increasingly evident interaction and interdependence among 
them.” (ICISS Report, 2001, p. 4). 
 
The authors of the report also emphasize the importance of new expectations toward international 
organizations, as they are increasingly seen as responsible and legitimate to take upon an action 
(including military one) in grave circumstances pertaining to human security. Those expectations, as 
already mentioned, are underpinned by an evolving debate on human rights, security, and 
development with the recognition that the unsolved conflicts are not contained to a single place (i.e. 
borders of nation state), but may lead to ‘spill-over’ effects to many other neighboring states or even 
to ramifications at a global level (with terrorism being the obvious example).  
 
Sovereignty has not been ‘taken away’ from states however, nor has it been constricted. What has 
happened, as a result of concerns described above, is rather reconceptualization of what sovereignty 
means and what rights and obligations it imposes over states and its governments15 (Breslin, 2007, p. 
201; Paris, 2003 pp. 450-451). The report of the ICISS clearly states: “There is no transfer or 
dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as 
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties.” (2001, p. 13).  This 
means that the national authorities of the state are 1) responsible for the protection of their citizens 
                                                          
15 Carsten Stahn, however, argues that “The shift from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility appears to 
be less radical than suggested by its history” (2007, p. 111). The author giving an historical account states that the 
recognition that the notion of sovereignty encompasses also the duty to protect state’s citizens is not as revolutionary 
as contemporary academics writing on R2P suggest (2007, pp. 111-114). 
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(internally), 2) responsible to international community (externally), 3) accountable for their actions 
(ibid., p.13).  
 
The concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is quite a recent one, and it is highly contested 
whether it has already been institutionalized and internalized by international actors to the extent 
that it may be considered as a ‘new norm’. Paul D. Williams defines norms as “collective 
expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” where “norm’s strength is measured by the 
lever of opprobrium community members attract from their peers for engaging in behavior that 
violates the norm. If no criticism occurs then a norm cannot be said to exist” (2007, p. 258). The 
scholar further argues that “international norms are internalized and implemented domestically 
through processes of socialization that involve (…): 1) instrumental adaptation and strategic 
bargaining; 2) moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion; 3) 
institutionalization and habituation” (ibid., p. 259). However, in case of R2P, its strength as a norm is 
quite troublesome to measure, as it has not been clearly pronounced who has a duty to act in grave 
circumstances and who exactly is to decide when the action should be undertaken.  However, I 
argue that some indicators of norm internalization by the UN can be observed.  
 
The idea of R2P introduced by the report of the ICISS ignited a significant debate within the UN. 
Carsten Stahn points out that three important documents have been issued by the organization on 
this matter: the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility published in 2004, the report of the UN Secretary-General In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All issued in March 2005 and The Outcome Document 
of the 2005 World Summit in September 2005 (Stahn, 2007, pp. 105-110).   
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Additionally, the report issued in 2009 by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, led to renewed discussion at the General Assembly in 2009. Subsequently, 
assessment of this debate has been published by the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 
which singled out the areas of consensus pertaining to the acceptance of R2P among nation states16, 
but also emphasized the areas of concern and disagreement, including: doubts over selectivity and 
double standards of R2P application, claims that R2P might be leading in certain instances to 
unilateral actions as well as concerns over the definition of threshold of when the coercive action 
may be employed against the state and who is to decide to act (GCR2P Report, 2009). From the 
close reading of this assessment, one can conclude that while most of the UN’s member states 
support the principle, the question how to operationalize it is still widely open and contested.  
 
The principle of R2P could therefore be probably best described as an ‘evolving norm’. While 
strategic bargaining is ongoing and the principle is gaining more prominence and visibility within the 
international community, lack of agreement on its further institutionalization leads to the situation 
that its deployment its still rather a moral issue resting on “a voluntary, rather than a mandatory 
engagement” (Stahn, 2007, p. 109).  
 
To exercise efficiently activities connected with the R2P principles, the UN envisions involvement 
of regional and sub-regional organizations. As Tom Kabau notes “[regional] organizations are (…) 
expected to provide mechanisms through which the concept is to be implemented. Regional 
organizations can provide the mechanisms for the implementation of the concept through various 
approaches, including peaceful negotiations and consensual interventions” (2012, p. 57). The report 
                                                          
16 The Report states “With the exception of a handful of delegations, speakers affirmed that 2005 was not open for 
renegotiation. States supported the Secretary-General’s view that R2P was an ally of sovereignty. At least two-thirds of 
the statements spoke positively of the Secretary-General’s report; more  than 40 explicitly welcomed it. Over 50 states 
endorsed his formulation of a three pillar strategy – state responsibility; assistance to states; and timely and decisive 
action by the international community. And there was unanimity on the importance of the first two pillars and the 
fundamental obligation to prevent mass atrocity crimes” (GCR2P Report, 2009, pp. 1-2). 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
33 
of the Secretary-General issued in 2011, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, acknowledges both the importance and achievements of the 
AU and sub-regional organizations emphasizing that they “were in vanguard of the international 
efforts to develop both the principles of protection and the practical tools for achieving them” 
(2011, p. 2). As a matter of fact, the involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations is 
provisioned even in the UN Charter, as the Chapter VIII entitled “Regional Arrangements” states:  
 
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations” ([Art. 52(1)], UN Charter). 
 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter further takes note that states which are the members of such 
regional arrangements in cases of conflict situations, should consult those organizations first, before 
referring them to the Security Council ([Art. 52(2)], UN Charter). On the issue of enforcement 
actions, the UN Charter states that: 
 
“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council (…)” ([Art. 53(1)], UN Charter). 
 
The already mentioned report of the Secretary-General additionally emphasizes the importance of 
regional development of Early Warning Systems in the context of conflict prevention. This would 
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facilitate information sharing, as well as the significance of the development of regional stand-by 
forces, which would be able to complement or act on behalf of the UN, if the need for deployment 
of military troops arises (2011, p. 9). 
 
Naturally, the gradual internationalization of the R2P principle by international actors cannot be 
solely ascribed to activities undertaken by the UN. A prominent role has been played also by civil 
society, which voices its support for the norm, for example through different advocacy NGOs or 
humanitarian agencies. The role of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International 
Crisis Group and many others should be emphasized, as they constitute a strong lobby and have the 
potential to influence choices and policies of crucial decision-makers. 
 
To conclude, despite R2P being the norm ‘in making’ and some aspects of its operationalization still 
being disputed and contested, its embracement by the international community has significant 
implications for regional and sub-regional organizations responsible for peace and security. As 
emphasized in the report of the Secretary-General, those bodies in many instances “are closer to the 
events on the ground, may have access to more detailed information, may have more nuanced 
understanding of the history and culture, may be more directly affected by the consequences of the 
action taken or not taken, and may be critical to the implementation of decisions taken in New 
York” (2011, p. 3). 
 
3.2. Changing Security Culture on Continental Level: From Organization of African Unity to 
African Union 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963. At that time, the OAU’s primary 
concern and duty was the support of national liberation struggles taking place throughout the 
continent, and “to act as a guardian of Africa’s independence from colonial rule” (Engel & Porto, 
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2010, p. 1). Paul D. Williams argues that the establishment of the organization “was a crucial 
moment in the process of norm socialization on the continent” (2007, p. 263). The OAU from its 
inception was guided by the four principles, namely: equality of its member states, recognition of 
their sovereignty, the rule of non-interference into one’s internal affairs, and the principle of 
territorial integrity (Engel & Porto, 2010, p. 1; Williams, 2007).  
 
The reorganization of the OAU into a new body – the AU in 2002 - can be seen as another 
significant threshold in socializations of norms in the continental context. Reasons for this 
restructuring were manifold: from changes taking place in the international environment (fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the dissolution of Soviet Union), through rising number of violent conflicts on the 
African continent, to the unwillingness of international community to prevent atrocities in Rwanda 
and Somalia (Engel & Porto, 2010, p. 1). Not infrequently the OAU had been accused as being a club 
of dictators, who were deaf for the needs of commoners, being too much “preoccupied with lofty 
political ideals and declarations, which bore little resemblance to the challenges posed by extreme 
poverty, conflict, governance and respect for human rights” (ibid. p. 1). The strict attachment to the 
rules of sovereignty and non-interference left the OAU unable to act and respond to those new 
challenges.  
 
However, the crucial factor in the change of the OAU into the AU was the involvement and 
contribution of the three regional leaders of that time: Muammar Gaddaffi of Libya, Thabo Mbeki 
of South Africa, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The reasons for Mbeki’s and Obasanjo’s 
involvement in the creation of the AU was two-fold: both leaders wanted to retain the economic 
and political status of their countries through the promotion of a neo-liberal agenda, which best 
served the new geo-political interests of their countries. Due to this, they saw it desirable to become 
main advocates of peace and stability, democracy, rule of law, good governance, sustainable 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
36 
economic development, and fundamental human rights on the continent (Francis, 2006, pp. 27-28). 
As for Col. Gaddaffi, the main reason for his involvement pertained to his intended rehabilitation as 
a progressive leader in the eyes of Western powers, but most of all “as a legitimate statesman to do 
business with” (ibid., p. 26). More precisely, he aimed at for the removal of sanctions from Libya and 
the possibilities to increase the county’s revenue from oil trade. Therefore, he seized the project of 
the AU’s creation as he perceived it as a unique opportunity to regain his status on the international 
arena. Gaddaffi could offer something that other leaders could not: the financial clout for the 
creation of a new body (ibid., p. 29).  
 
Overall, the reorganization of the OAU into the AU was seen as not only ‘old wine in new bottles’, 
but as a real progress toward democratization and commitment to the rule of law among African 
leaders. As noticed by Engel and Porto, the AU has to a great extend built upon principles 
previously upheld by the OAU. There is also a set of new principles, out of which the most 
important are “respect for democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for sanctity of human rights” (ibid., p. 3), together 
with the very important right of the AU to intervene in the affairs of its member states “in respect of 
grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” ([Art. 4(h)], AU 
Constitutive Act)17. This opened a way for the AU to adopt legal action, including military 
deployment, against its own member states. Another novelty under the rubric of the AU’s guiding 
principles is Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates “condemnation and rejection of 
unconstitutional changes of governments”. Paul D. Williams argues that despite those two principles 
of the new-born organization being included into its Constitutive Act, it is arguable whether they 
have already been fully internalized by the AU and its member states (Williams, 2007).  
                                                          
17 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted in 2003) expanded the principle 
encapsulated in Art 4 (h) by adding “serious threat to legitimate order” as a situation which gives the Union the right 
to intervene. E. Baimu and K. Sturman (2003) argue that the inclusion of this principle constitutes a step backward 
from protecting of human rights.  
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
37 
 
Insofar as the principle pertaining to ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ is considered, three 
documents institutionalizing the norm should be mentioned, the: 1) Declaration on the Framework for an 
OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI)) adopted in 2000 in 
Lomé, 2) Declaration of the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa adopted in 2002, and 3) 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in January 2007, but which entered into 
force only recently on January 15, 2012. The Lomé Declaration defined the unconstitutional change 
of government as:  
 
“i) military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government; 
ii) intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government; 
iii) replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and 
rebel movements; 
iv) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party 
after free, fair and regular elections.” 
 
In 2007, with the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the fifth 
element expanding the definition of ‘unconstitutional change’ was added. It stated that “any 
amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the 
principles of democratic change of government.” ([Art. 23(5)], AU, 2007) should be considered as 
an unconstitutional change of government. The Charter since coming into force in January 2012, 
contrary to previously discussed documents, is legally binding for signatories.  
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While Williams asserts that “(…) evidence appears to support the argument that the AU has 
internalized – as well as institutionalized – this new norm” (2007, p 274), Ulf Engel is more skeptical 
about this, claiming that: 
 
“In general, the Union has started to effectively live-up to the expectations which were 
created in Africa and elsewhere by adopting these norms in the first place – though 
selectively: In some cases the African Union kept a rather muted stance (…). So far the 
results of the African Union’s policy on unconstitutional changes of government are 
mixed: The rather successful policy on Mauritania and, mostly likely Niger, is faced by 
lack of progress on Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau.” (Engel, 2010, p. 13) 
 
It has to be noted however, that Engel is not so much critical about the state of internalization of the 
norm by the Union, as about the lack of clarity and standards of its operationalization. 
 
As already mentioned, R2P has been institutionalized by the AU in its Constitutive Act in 2000. 
However, the AU has never invoked Article 4(h) in situations which arguably required such a 
decision. Paul D. Williams believes that the reluctance of the AU to take upon more decisive action 
pertaining to the situation in Darfur evidences lack of full internalization of the norm by the 
organization18 (2007, p. 278). The issue of R2P internalization by the AU however requires further 
in-depth research and case-to-case analyses of responses of the AU to continental conflicts. 
 
While both ‘new principles’ of the AU discussed above are still undergoing a process of full 
internalization, institutionalization of them has had significant repercussions for Regional Economic 
                                                          
18 Williams at the same time signals the lack of any significant advocacy to address the situation in Darfur through the 
prism of R2P by the UN Security Council or individual states. He concludes: “the responsibility-to-protect principle 
has yet to be fully internalized anywhere in the world” (2007, p. 278).  
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Communities (RECs). The Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union envisioned 
establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a “standing decision-making organ for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” ([Art. 2(1)], PSC Protocol). De facto, the PSC 
Protocol, besides the establishment of the PSC itself, provisioned also for the establishment of other 
institutions which altogether constitute the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the: 1) 
Panel of Wise [Art. 11]; 2) Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) [Art. 12]; 3) African Standby 
Force (ASF) [Art. 13]; and 4) Peace Fund [Art. 21]. Additionally, the PSC Protocol makes an 
important provision on the inclusion of regional mechanisms responsible for the promotion of 
peace and security into APSA.  
 
RECs, being the building blocks of the AU in which most regional mechanisms for peace and 
security are vested, have been tasked with the development of observation and monitoring units 
which would support and cooperate with CEWS, as well as with erecting regional standby brigades.19 
The more active role of the AU in promoting peace and security influences regional organizations as 
“the African Union favors a principle of regional subsidiary and expects the respective Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) to be the first to get involved into conflict mediation – 
coordination at a sub-regional and international level is critical” (Engel & Porto, 2010, p. 8).  
 
                                                          
19 For the account of the detailed development of those two pillars of APSA see: E. Wane et al. (2010).  The Continental 
Early Warning System: Methodology and Approach. In: U. Engel, J. G. Porto, ed. 2010, Africa’s New Peace and Security 
Architecture. Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions. Farnham: Ashgate; J. Cilliers, J. Pottgieter (2010).  The African 
Standby Force. In: U. Engel, J. G. Porto, ed. 2010, Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture. Promoting Norms, 
Institutionalizing Solutions. Farnham: Ashgate. For an overview and assessment of APSA pillars’ efficiency and state of 
development see also: African Peace and Security Architecture. 2010 Assessment Study (2010). Report Commissioned by the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Department. Available: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf  
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This division of labor between the AU and RECs was sealed in January 2008, when the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by the parties20. The MoU is a binding 
document, which delineates “principles, rights and obligations to be applied in the relationship 
between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms” ([Art. 3], 2008a, AU). As is 
recognizable, efficient operationalization of APSA cannot be accomplished without the involvement 
and active participation of regional actors, as well as harmonization of procedures and systems 
between them.  
 
I argue that changes taking place at the continental and regional levels pertaining to the security 
culture should be seen as mutually reinforcing processes. The emergence of new norms and 
institutions at the continental level influence significantly regional structures, but at the same time, 
the process of change cannot be accomplished without consent and willful cooperation from sub-
regional actors.  
 
3.3. The New Partnership for Africa’s  Development and African Peer Review Mechanism 
David Francis in his book “Uniting Africa”, expresses the opinion that “The African Union cannot 
be discussed without serious reference and analysis of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD)” (2006, p. 131). To broaden his argument, I argue that not only NEPAD 
should be taken into account, but also one of its most important achievements, the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM). APRM aims at fostering transparency, democracy and good 
governance, and has the potential to further internalize the new norms and principles discussed in 
the previous subchapters. It also demonstrates commitment of individual African states and their 
leaders pertaining to incorporation of those principles and values into their political agendas. 
                                                          
20 Full title of the document: Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the African 
Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and 
Northern Africa. The document was signed by representatives of CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, 
IGAD, UMA and SADC and representatives of AU (Porto & Engel, 2010, p. 151).  
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NEPAD was adopted in 2001 and incorporated into structures of the AU (Francis, 2006, p. 131). 
The primary objective of the program was “poverty eradication, promotion of sustainable growth 
and development, and the empowerment of women through building genuine partnerships at 
country, regional and global levels” (NEPAD’s Official Webpage). Söderbaum and Hettne 
emphasize that NEPAD is unique, in comparison with previous socio-recovery programs for Africa, 
as it “stresses a closer engagement (and ‘partnership’) with the North, as well as good governance, 
democracy and an improvement in Africa’s political-economic leadership” (2010, p. 21). Similarly, 
Francis stresses that NEPAD’s commitment to good economic and political governance, peace, 
security and democracy, constitute prominent characteristic of the program (2006, p. 132).  
 
In July 2002, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in the Declaration on 
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance provisioned the establishment of the 
APRM. APRM is a voluntary self-monitoring mechanism, open for all states of the AU for 
accession.  
 
APRM is a form of assessment for the states’ performance in the areas of democracy and political 
governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic 
development (NEPAD’s Official Webpage), based on five forms of review (Herbert & Gruzd, 2008, 
p. 5). Firstly, state authorities with support of civil society conduct self-assessment of its conduct 
and deliver two documents: Country Self-Assessment Report and Program of Action. Secondly, 
APRM Country Review Report is prepared by the group of “eminent African academics, diplomats, 
business people and governance experts” (ibid., p.5). Thirdly, report is being discussed among the 
group who prepared the report and the head of state, which is subjected to the review. In the next 
step, the country’s progress in implementing recommendations encapsulated in the Program of 
Action is being reviewed annually. Finally, every two to four years another self-assessment of the 
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country should be held, closing the circle (ibid., p. 5). Thus far, thirty countries have officially joined 
APRM, out of which fourteen were subjected to the review21 (NEPAD Official Webpage). Even 
though APRM faces many challenges, including its complexity, lengthy time-consumption, high 
costs, and still unclear rules of conduct of reviews22 (ibid.), it has the potential to increase the 
transparency and accountability of many areas pertaining to political and economic aspects, enhance 
national dialog and build trust. As Herbert and Gruzd aptly put it:  
 
“At many levels, the APRM is an exceptional undertaking. For a continent that has 
jealously protected its sovereignty, it is diplomatically exceptional for nations to throw 
themselves open to outside scrutiny. Politically, it is unprecedented for incumbent 
governments to provide civil society and foreign experts a chance to write a definitive 
critique of national performance” (Herbert & Gruzd, 2008, p. 5).  
 
To harness fully the potential of the APRM, the mechanism and process of its implementation has 
to be still significantly strengthened. Also, there are concerns about the politicization of APRM in a 
way that “[g]overnments can use the APRM to reposition themselves as champions of reform and 
win political credit for fostering rather than frustrating reform”. (Herbert & Gruzd, 2008, p. 6). 
Notwithstanding all those challenges, the APRM is an interesting and innovative endeavor, as the 
initiative and will to take part in the whole process has been handed over not merely to state 
                                                          
21 According to the official web page of NEPAD, the countries who are the members of APRM are: Algeria, Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia (status from 29.01.2011). Countries subjected to the review until 
January 2011 are: Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Ethiopia. It is worth emphasizing that eight out of fifteen members of SADC are members of 
APRM, but only three of them were so far reviewed.  
22 Herber and Gruzd point out that for such a complex process of country reviews as provisioned by APRM, the 
expertise and knowledge distribution among both civil society, as well as individuals involved personally in conducting 
it, is inadequate: “The system is complex, the rules are unclear in certain respects and little attention has been paid to 
training and advising the countries that sign up for review. Governments and civil society often do not fully 
understand the process, but more importantly lack information on the financial, logistical, research and political 
implications of launching such a large-scale public consultation.” (2008, p. 6). 
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authorities, but also to representatives of civil society and individuals connected with business. If the 
mechanism becomes ameliorated and more states embrace it, it has the potential to hasten the 
internalization of norms of transparency, good governance, democracy etc., and be a catalyst for a 
real change. In the words of Herbert and Gruzd “[APRM] represents a greater opportunity for 
governments to escape the political blame game and start afresh” (ibid. p. 6). It is crucial to grasp the 
potential to enhance mutual trust between states, open inclusive dialogue between ruling class and 
society, as well as building up a community based on shared values.  
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Chapter Four: Establishment, Structure and Development of the SADC  
This chapter aims to provide some basic background information on the SADC. First of all, it gives 
a historical overview of the development of regional integration in the Southern African region. It 
starts by examining the factors and incentives which influenced the regional leaders’ decision to 
establish the SADC. Secondly, it scrutinizes the objectives that the community expects to achieve as 
well as the principles which guide its development. Finally, it examines the institutions established by 
the SADC Treaty and, where feasible, provides assessment of their conduct and efficiency. 
 
4.1. Establishment of the SADC – A Historical Context 
As was already hinted in the introduction of this thesis, the SADC was established on August 17, 
1992 in Windhoek with the primary aim of economic integration and development. However, the 
roots of the SADC reach back to 1975, when Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Zambia established the FLS. The FLS, being the first regional, though informal, body, was primarily 
concerned with political liberation of the region from colonial rule and with the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa (RISDP, 2003, p.1). At a time when most of the countries in the region 
had finally achieved independence, other challenges came to the fore. Namely, poverty and 
economic backwardness. “Thus, the leaders saw the promotion of economic and social development 
through co-operation and integration as the next logical step after political independence” (RISDP, 
2003, p.1). It was against this background that the SADCC was launched. The SADCC, 
encompassing Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, constituted a platform for coordination of their economic policies. The main aim of the 
SADCC was not only to gain economic independence from South Africa, but also “to forge links to 
create genuine and equitable regional integration; to mobilize resources for implementing national 
and interstate policies; and to take concerted action to secure international co-operation within the 
framework of the strategy of economic liberation” (RISDP, 2003, p.2). 
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The transition of the SADCC into the SADC in 1992 was dictated by several factors connected with 
a changing international, continental as well as regional political and economic environment. First of 
all, the end of the Cold War brought an ideological thaw between many states in the region, thus 
forging wider acceptance for multi-party systems (Nathan, 2006, p. 608) and constituting a push 
factor toward (partial) democratization. Additionally, the year 1990 marked the formal end of 
colonialism in Southern Africa, as Namibia gained independence and signs of the end of white-
minority rule in South Africa were under way (RISDP, 2003, p. 2). On the continental level the 
OAU took steps to establish the African Economic Community, which envisioned Southern Africa 
as constituting one of its pillars (ibid.). This required the member states of the region to change their 
focus from merely ad hoc economic cooperation to long-term oriented regional economic 
integration (Nathan, 2006, p. 608). Finally, with the ascendant era of globalization and the decreasing 
interests of western powers in Africa, there was a “deep concern about the growing marginalization 
of Sub-Saharan Africa” (ibid.). All of the above-mentioned factors were decisive to the leaders of 
Southern Africa’s states in their replacing the SADCC and establishing in its place a strengthened 
body, the SADC, which would be an international organization with legal status.23 Nathan points out 
that the SADC was different from the SADCC, as it “included regional power, South Africa, its 
primary goal goes beyond economic co-ordination to encompass regional integration; and its 
mandate extends to the political and security spheres” (ibid., pp. 607-608).  
 
4.2. Aims, Objectives and Principles of the SADC 
The aims and objectives of the SADC are concluded in the two most important documents of the 
community: the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
                                                          
23 While both FLS and SADCC did not have a legal status, the SADC does. Article 2 of the SADC Treaty proclaims: 
“SADC shall be an international organization, and shall have legal personality with capacity and power to enter into 
contract, acquire, own or dispose of movable or immovable property and to sue and be sued”.  
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(hereafter: the Protocol), which seeks to provide the framework for the Organ. The SADC Treaty 
promulgates objectives pertaining inter alia to socio-economic development of the region with a 
special focus on the most disadvantaged citizens, the promotion of democratic and legitimate 
institutions, consolidation and maintenance of peace, security and stability, advancement of self-
sustainability of the member states, harmonization and coordination of programs and strategies on a 
regional and national level as well as environment protection, the combat of communicable diseases 
(HIV/AIDS) and gender mainstreaming [Art. 5(1)]24. The SADC Treaty also specifies the methods 
for achieving the above objectives, which are: harmonization of member states’ political and 
socioeconomic policies, involvement of civil society in implementing the SADC’s policies, creation 
of adequate institutions and mechanisms, development of policies which allow for free movement 
of people, capital, labor, goods and services across the region, development of both human 
resources and technology and advancement of international relations among the SADC’s member 
states [Art. 5(2)]. Five guiding principles of the community to which all of the member states should 
adhere include “a) sovereign equality of all Member States; b) solidarity, peace and security; c) 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law; d) equity, balance and mutual benefit; and e) peaceful 
settlement of disputes” ([Art. 4], SADC Treaty).  
 
The objectives that are enshrined in the Protocol address issues connected with the promotion and 
maintenance of peace and security in the region. The notion of security as encapsulated in the 
Protocol consists of both the components of a traditional understanding of security (state security) 
as well as of human security. The aims and objectives of the Organ, however, will be addressed in 
detail in the chapter dedicated to the development and structure of this body (Chapter Five).  
 
 
                                                          
24 For a full list of the SADC’s objectives check: SADC Treaty, Art. 5(1). 
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4.3. Institutional Structure of the SADC 
The SADC Treaty provided for the basic structure of the community by establishing eight 
institutions, the: 1) Summit of Heads of State and Government; 2) Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation; 3) Council of Ministers; 4) Integrated Committee of Ministers; 5) Standing 
Committee of Officials; 6) Secretariat; 7) Tribunal; and 8) SADC National Committees. Each of 
these institutions is briefly discussed below, apart from the Organ whose structures are discussed in 
Chapter Five.  
 
The Summit of Heads of State and Government is “the supreme policy-making institution of 
SADC” which is “responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of 
SADC” ([Art. 10(1-2)], SADC Treaty). The Summit operates on the basis of the so-called Troika, 
which consists of the Chairperson of the SADC, the Incoming Chairperson and the Outgoing 
Chairperson ([Art. 9A(2)], SADC Treaty). The Chairperson and the Incoming Chairperson are 
selected by the Summit from members of the Summit for a period of one year ([Art. 10(4)], SADC 
Treaty). Currently, these functions are being performed by Armando Emilio Guebuza, the President 
of the Republic of Mozambique, and President Joyce Banda of the Republic of Malawi, respectively 
(SADC Summit Communiqué, 2012, p. 1). The Summit should convene at least two meetings a year. 
The decisions of the Summit are binding and need to be taken by consensus ([Art. 10(9)], SADC 
Treaty). As Jakkie Cilliers aptly points out, the required consensus for decision-making leads to a 
situation where each of the members of the Summit have, in fact, the right of veto (1999, p. 11). 
 
The Council of Ministers (hereafter: the Council) consists of “one Minister from each Member 
State, preferably a Minister responsible for Foreign or External Affairs”25 ([Art. 11(9)], SADC 
                                                          
25 Before the SADC Treaty was amended in August 2001 the ministers who were supposed to be incorporated into the 
Council were preferably to be responsible for economic planning and finance. This change represents a further shift in 
the focus of the SADC from merely economic cooperation toward a more holistic approach to integration.  
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Treaty). The Council is, among others, responsible for implementation of the SADC policies, plays 
an advisory role to the Summit in terms of functioning and development of the SADC as well as 
coordinates and supervises institutions which are subordinate to it. The Council, similarly as the 
Summit, operates on the basis of the Troika system. The SADC Treaty requires that the Council 
meet at least four times a year [Art. 11(4)]. 
 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers (hereafter: the Committee of Ministers), which reports 
directly to the Council, consists of at least two ministers from each member state ([Art. 12(1)], 
SADC Treaty). The Committee of Ministers is a relatively new institution provisioned in the 
amended SADC Treaty as a part of the SADC’s restructurization process which replaced former 
commissions. It is responsible for monitoring and control of implementation of the Regional 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), management of the directorates’ work (vested in 
the SADC Secretariat), and has a mandate to oversee and guide the Secretariat’s work. It bears 
responsibility for managing areas of integration connected with “1) trade, industry, finance and 
investment; 2) infrastructure and services; 3) food, agriculture and natural resources and 4) social 
and human development and special programs” ([Art. 12(2a)], SADC Treaty). The Committee of 
Ministers, similarly as the Summit and the Council, operates on the basis of the Troika. It is obliged 
to convene a meeting at least once a year ([Art. 12(5)], SADC Treaty). 
 
The Standing Committee of Officials’ (hereafter: the Standing Committee) main responsibility is to 
provide the Council with technical advisory. It is also directly responsible to the Council. The 
Standing Committee should consist of one permanent official from each Member State ([Art. 13(1)], 
SADC Treaty). Additionally, the SADC Treaty envisages that the Standing Committee operate on 
the basis of the Troika system and that it call a meeting at least four times a year [Art. 13(6)].  
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The Secretariat is the executive institution of the SADC, which is headed by the Executive Secretary 
(currently Dr Tomaz Augusto Salomão) with support of the Deputy Executive Secretary. The 
primary responsibilities of the Secretariat as an executive body include, among others, 
implementation of decisions of the Summit, the Council, the Committee of Ministers and of the 
Organ and their respective Troikas; finances; promotion of the SADC’s activities; administration; 
strategic planning; harmonization of policies and strategies of its member states; and organization of 
the community’s meetings ([Art. 14(1a-f)], SADC Treaty). The Secretariat’s mandate has been 
extended even further in the process of the SADC’s restructurization, thus adding to the 
Secretariat’s responsibilities functions that are connected with, inter alia, mobilization of resources, 
including development of strategies of self-financing; monitoring the status of regional programs 
implementation of policies; development and  maintenance of communication technology for the 
region; assuring mainstreaming of gender in the community’s activities; oversight of the SADC’s 
special programs; and conducting research on the integration process within the SADC ([Art. 14(1g-
p)], SADC Treaty). 
 
It is not infrequently emphasized by researchers on SADC that its Secretariat is significantly 
understaffed and, at the same time, overburdened with responsibilities (see: Cilliers, 1999, p. 12; 
Fisher & Ngoma, 2005, p. 7-8; ICG, 2012). The SADC Secretariat Capacity Development 
Framework, issued in March 2008, indeed points to this problem explicitly by stating that 
restructurization of the SADC concentrated many different responsibilities on the Secretariat which 
had previously been decentralized (SADC Secretariat, 2008). The multitude of tasks ascribed to the 
Secretariat forces it to simultaneously fulfill the role of think tank, principal regional coordinator, 
provider of support services and professional ‘program manager’ (ibid., p. 5). The document 
concludes that: “The new roles (…) demonstrate the huge demands placed on the abilities and 
capacities of Secretariat which it is not able to perform in the present set up required standards due 
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to severe institutional capacity constraints as well as lack of requisite competencies for staff” (ibid., p. 
5). The permanent headquarters of the Secretariat are located in Gaborone, Botswana.  
 
The SADC National Committees (SNCs), which are new structures of the SADC established by 
amendments to the SADC Treaty in 2001, consist of the key stakeholders of each respective 
member state. According to the SADC Treaty, those stakeholders should include government, 
private sector, civil society, NGOs and workers’ and employers’ organizations [Art. 16A(13)]. The 
SNCs constitute a platform for wider involvement of the people of the region in the decision-
making processes taking place at the SADC level. The RISDP also anticipates that: 
 
“SNCs will be the entry point between SADC and Member States and will be 
responsible for coordinating and mobilizing national consensus on issues of regional 
importance. They shall also make critical inputs into regional policy and strategy 
formulation taking into consideration the peculiarities and interests of particular 
Member States. SNCs also have the responsibility to ensure the harmonization of 
national with regional policies and the streamlining of RISDP activities into national 
development plans.” (RISDP, 2003, p. 87-88). 
 
Additionally, the SNCs are tasked with duties pertaining to implementation of the SADC programs 
on a national level and to advancement of communication between individual member states and 
the Secretariat ([Art. 16A(4)], SADC Treaty; Nzewi & Zakwe, 2009, p. 10). The SNCs have 
theoretically opened an unprecedented opportunity for citizens of the SADC member states to 
contribute to the policy-making process of the community. However, as Nzewi and Zakwe found in 
their research on the level of the stakeholders’ participation in SNCs’ activity: “[a]ll indications are 
that SNCs are still largely government-centric and inept, which brings into question the degree of 
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policy influence that is actually afforded to civil society” (2009, p. 46). Moreover, Mozambique is the 
only state whose SNC structures are fully developed and functional (ICG Report, 2012).26 
 
The last body provisioned by the SADC Treaty has had a rather turbulent trajectory that still poses a 
major headache both to the leaders of the SADC as well as to the different civil society groups and 
human rights proponents. The Tribunal was already established in 1992 by the SADC Treaty, 
however, it became operational only in 200527 (SADC Tribunal Official Web Page). Despite the 
Tribunal being initially established mainly to “ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of 
the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be 
referred to it” ([Art. 16(1)], SADC Treaty), it also later allowed individuals to make claims about 
human rights abuses against their own nation states, under condition that local remedies had been 
exhausted (Ruppel, 2009, p. 296). As can be read in the publication issued by the Tribunal itself: 
 
“The SADC Tribunal is not a human rights court per se. The Tribunal has ruled that it 
does have jurisdiction to entertain human rights matters as one of the principles of 
SADC is the observance of human rights, democracy and rule of law. On this basis it 
is possible to bring a violation of human rights before the Tribunal.” (SADC Tribunal, 
nd. p. 3). 
 
                                                          
26 Participation of the civil society in the SADC’s undertakings is in general rather marginal. The SNCs are not yet fully 
functional and are still government-based; the SADC Parliamentary forum also remains powerless as it does not have 
legislative powers; and the SADC Council of NGO (SADC-CNGO), which has been active since its inception in 1998 
and comprises NGOs from all of the SADC’s states, is not meaningfully taken into account by the community as the 
body which should have an important advisory role in the SADC’s policy-making processes (Matlosa & Lotshwao, 
2010, pp. 40-42).  
27 The reasons for such a long delay in operationalization of the SADC Tribunal are not provided on the SADC 
Tribunal’s Official Page. However, as Oliver C. Ruppel pointed out, in the course of the Tribunal’s establishment 
different human rights instruments were considered for establishment, which were then turned down (Ruppel, 2009, 
p. 291) and which possibly delayed operationalization of the body.  
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However, already by August 2010 the operations of the Tribunal were significantly limited as a result 
of differences in the interpretation of Tribunal jurisdiction eventuating from the Tribunal’s ruling 
over the William Campbell and another v Republic of Zimbabwe case.28 The SADC Summit, instead of 
helping the Tribunal enforce its adjudications against Zimbabwe, decided at that time to review until 
August 2012 “the role, responsibilities, and terms of reference of the Tribunal” (Matyszak, 2011, p. 
nd). As a consequence, “[t]he Tribunal was not to hear any further cases henceforth, whether 
pending or otherwise, and members of the Tribunal were not to be reappointed or replaced, 
effectively rendering the Tribunal inquorate and defunct” (ibid.). This decision of the Summit to, in 
fact, suspend the Tribunal’s activities have been seen as disturbing among human rights activists: “It 
is an alarming sign that the member states, faced with a contested ruling, failed to take any steps to 
enforce it and instead paralyzed and try to weaken the Tribunal itself” (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
 
In fact, the main deficiency of the Tribunal is that, in spite of its final decisions being binding, it has 
no enforcement mechanisms over member states that refuse to comply with its rulings. The only 
mechanism available to the Tribunal is “to refer cases of non-compliance to the SADC Summit for 
the latter to take appropriate steps” (Ruppel, 2009, p. 300). However, the last SADC Summit of 
Heads of State and Government, which took place on August 17-18, 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique, 
ruled – to the chagrin of many civil society forums, human rights groups and lawyers associations29 
– that “(…) a new Protocol on the Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be 
confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member 
                                                          
28 The SADC Tribunal ruled in November 2008 that dispossession of farmers from their land by the government of 
Zimbabwe violated human rights and commanded that Zimbabwe pay compensation to the farmers. Zimbabwe did 
not comply with those orders (Matyszak, 2011, pp. nd). All adjudications of the SADC Tribunal can be found on the 
official SADC Tribunal web page.  
29 Among many others, disapproval of the Summit’s decision has been voiced by the International Commission of 
Jurists, SADC Lawyers Association, and the Southern Africa Litigation Centre  (ICJ&SADC LA&SALC, 2012), and 
the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (Lee, 2012a). Efforts to save the mandate of the SADC Tribunal and 
to adjudicate claims pertaining to human rights abuses have also been supported by Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Tutu (SALC, 2012). 
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States” (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2012). The decision of the Summit clearly indicates the lack 
of a real commitment to the rule of law, democracy and human rights norms among the leaders of 
the SADC’s members states as well as to the principles they decided to adhere to by signing the 
SADC Treaty. It also proved that the Summit is not ready to hand over some of its powers 
pertaining to decision-making to other bodies, and that the community tends to care more about 
regime than human security. 
 
An institution that was not directly envisioned in the SADC Treaty but which was established at a 
later stage, in 1997, on the basis of Article 9(2) of the Treaty is the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
(Official Web Page of SADC Parliamentary Forum). The body is envisioned to be an “autonomous 
institution of SADC” (ibid.). It constitutes a consultative platform for representatives of national 
parliaments of the SADC member states who seek to influence the policy-making process of the 
community. The objectives of the SADC Parliamentary Forum center around strengthening the 
implementation capacity of the community’s policies, improving the efficiency of the SADC 
institutions, accelerating the pace of economic integration, promoting human rights, democracy, 
good governance, accountability and transparency along with promoting peace, stability and security 
in the region, disseminating the SADC’s aims, objectives and values, and engaging civil society and 
various stakeholders in the activities of SADC (SADC PF, 1996). 
 
To this end the SADC Parliamentary Forum decided to establish four organs: the Plenary Assembly, 
which is the main policy-making body; the Executive Committee which is responsible for, among 
others, implementation of the Plenary Assembly’s decisions; the Office of the Secretary-General; 
and five Standing Committees (the Legal Committee; Regional Development and Integration; 
Democratization, Government and Gender Equality; Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation and Capacity 
Development; HIV and AIDS; and Regional Women’s Parliamentary Caucus) (SADC PF, 1996; 
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official web page of the SADC Parliamentary Forum). The Forum‘s performance, however, has 
been assessed rather poorly. A monograph issued by the Institute for Security Studies, a research 
institution based in South Africa, points out the significant marginalization of the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum within SADC structures, which largely accounts for its inefficiency: 
 
“In its more than ten years of existence, the SADC PF has been peripheral to, if not 
completely excluded from, SADC decision-making structures and processes. It has not 
been consulted, nor has it contributed to regional policy formulation, including the 
more than 20 protocols and declarations that SADC has developed so far. Since the 
SADC PF is not considered a formal SADC structure and SADC structural 
arrangements do not envisage a role for parliaments in policy formulation, the only time 
that parliamentarians come into contact with regional policies and protocols is when the 
executive brings such instruments to national parliaments for ratification, and 
domestication into the domestic legal framework. At that time, such policies are fait 
accompli, as they have been signed by heads of state and government or responsible 
minister.” (Musavengana, 2011, p. 50). 
 
Further obstacles inhibiting the SADC Parliamentary Forum from exercising a more influential role 
are connected with weak national governments in the region in general, financial constraints, 
concerns of the member states about loss of sovereignty (Musavengana, 2011, p. vii), and the 
common perception of the Forum as merely an NGO (ibid., p. 51). Notwithstanding the 
impediments above, the SADC Parliamentary Forum has the ambition of strengthening its own 
position by transforming itself in the future into a more formal body – The SADC Parliament – 
which would be recognized explicitly by the SADC Treaty. 
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Chapter Five: Overview of the SADC’s Peace and Security Architecture 
One of the prominent outcomes of the transition from SADCC to SADC has been the extension of 
the organization’s mandate, which now also encompasses the areas of peace and security. It has 
been recognized by the leaders of the community that sustainable economic development and inter-
state cooperation are not possible without a stable and secure environment. On the other hand, also 
reverse links have been acknowledged, namely, that sustainable and fair economic development has 
the capacity to successfully foster human security in the region. A Framework and Strategy for Building 
the Community, the document that sought to translate the community’s principles into a regional 
integration program, explicitly stated that: 
 
“A new peace and security order is needed in Southern Africa, recognizing that 
defence and security have economic, environmental, political and social dimensions, 
which often pose non-military threats, but could threaten security and cause conflict. 
For instance, the abuse of human rights, economic underdevelopment, the lack of 
food and energy, constitute a threat to the security of the people. They also threaten 
the security of member States, since they invariably lead to conflict between countries, 
and between governments and the citizenry within countries.” (SADC, 1993, p. 30). 
The SADC Treaty, before the amendments, did not yet provision for a separate institution that 
would be responsible for peace and security cooperation. Nevertheless, it provided that “politics, 
diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” should constitute one of the areas of the 
member states’ cooperation [Art. 21(3g)] and that one of the SADC’s objectives should be to 
“promote and defend peace and security” [Art. 5(1c)].  
This chapter will therefore shed some light on the institutions and instruments which were erected 
by the community in order to address this area of cooperation. First of all, it gives an account of the 
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process of establishing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the Organ), which 
is the SADC body that is responsible for coordination of the member states’ activities and policies 
connected with security, defense and politics. Thereafter, it examines the community’s most crucial 
documents that set up the basis of the peace and security architecture in the region: The Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the Protocol); the Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ (SIPO); the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP); and the Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections. Finally, the chapter shortly elaborates on the establishment of two structures 
which constitute a part of both the SADC’s and AU’s security architecture: the SADC Standby 
Brigade (SADCBRIG) and the SADC Early Warning System (SADC EWS) as well as the intended 
development of the Mediation Unit and Panel of Elders. 
 
5.1. Establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
Despite the SADC leaders’ acknowledging the inextricable connection between peace, security and 
development very early in the history of the community, the anticipated establishment of a body 
managing the region’s sphere of security was a major issue and brought about a significant split 
among the community’s leaders. The Organ was officially established already in June of 1996 by 
decision of the SADC Summit (SADC Summit Communiqué, 1996). However, only in 2001, when 
the SADC’s leaders came to an agreement on the functions and structures of the Organ and 
concluded the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the Protocol), did long-
lasting stagnation come to an end and the Organ became operational. The bumpy trajectory of the 
Organ’s formation is worth a deeper investigation, as the protracted negotiations and disputes over 
the functions and structures of the body reveal deeper problems (Nathan, 2006), which are, 
arguably, still haunting the community. 
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An already mentioned document, i.e. A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community, envisaged a 
new defense and security order for Southern Africa which was to be accompanied by the creation of 
a new discourse on national and regional unity, accountability and transparency in both public 
debate and formulation of security policies, reduction in military spending, joint military training and 
information exchange, adoption of the “non-offensive defence” doctrine30, creation of a forum for 
arbitration and mediation as well as conclusion of a non-aggression treaty and mutual defense pact 
(1993, pp. 30-31). As can be seen, this ‘new defence and security order’ aimed to negotiate some 
common guidelines for the member states in order to foster general cooperation and information 
exchange in the areas of the politics, defense and security. What is, however, most important, is that 
it attempted to boost confidence and mutual trust among the community’s member states. 
 
The next step taken by the community was the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and 
Security, convened in Windhoek in July 1994, which “set SADC on a course towards formal 
involvement in security co-ordination, conflict mediation, and even military cooperation at heads of 
state level” (Cilliers, 1999, p. 19). The Workshop recommended that the Conflict Resolution and 
Political Cooperation sector should be created to deal with issues connected with security, and that 
responsibility for this sector should be assigned to one of the SADC’s member states (ibid.). Besides, 
the Workshop concluded that the Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution needs to be 
drafted (Malan, 1998a, np.; Cilliers, 1999, p. 19).  
 
Subsequently, during a meeting of the Council of Ministers which took place in Botswana, it was 
decided to abandon many of the Workshop’s recommendations as they had a potential to “infringe 
upon the sovereignty of member countries” (Malan, 1998a, np.). The idea of establishing Conflict 
                                                          
30 The ‘non-offensive defence’ doctrine aimed to “ensure adequate defence against external aggression, while 
minimizing offensive capabilities” (SADC, 1993, p. 31). 
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Resolution and Political Cooperation as a sector was also discarded in favor of the ‘SADC’s wing’ 
option (ibid.).  
 
At a meeting of the SADC Foreign Ministers in March 1995, the creation of yet another body – the 
Association of Southern African States (ASAS) – was suggested. The ASAS would be independent 
from the SADC Secretariat and responsive only directly to the SADC Summit (Malan, 1998a, np.; 
Cilliers, 1999, p. 19). Cilliers suggested that this proposal  was “a deliberate attempt to preserve the 
key features of the previous FLS arrangement, namely an informal and flexible modus operandi with 
unimpeded access to the SADC heads of state, while keeping bureaucracy to a minimum” (Cilliers, 
1999, p. 20). It needs to be mentioned at this point that the Foreign Ministers’ proposal of 
establishing the ASAS was partly unilateral, as it was not consulted with other stakeholders such as 
ministers responsible for defense, intelligence, etc. (ibid., p. 20). The idea of establishing the ASAS 
did not in the end receive much applause at the SADC Summit in August 1995 (especially the idea 
of creating the body as a sector under the auspices of one of the SADC’s member states was 
rejected) and more time was granted to ministers for further consultations.  
 
The prolonged debates over the structure of the security body and to what degree it should be 
independent from the SADC were commonly attributed to Mugabe’s expectations that the new 
body would continue the traditions of the FLS, his desire to become its permanent chair as well as 
his concerns over the increasing dominance of South Africa (Cilliers, 1999, p. 20). Laurie Nathan, 
however, who personally became involved in efforts pertaining to the establishment of a security 
regime of the SADC, came to the following conclusion: “It appeared that a consensus prevailed on 
the principles, objectives and strategies of the security forum and the issues in contention were 
limited to its status, structure and procedures. In retrospect (…) it is clear that many states did not 
support the anti-militarist and democratic norms” (Nathan, 2006, p. 609). Cilliers, in fact, formulates 
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a similar argument, claiming that most of the conflicts within the SADC resulted from “fundamental 
differences in political values and practices” (Cilliers, 1999, p. 25). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the long-lasting deadlock was finally broken and in January 1996 the 
SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was established with its official launch during the 
SADC Summit in Botswana on June 28, 1996 (SADC Summit Communiqué, 1996). The 
Communiqué issued after the Summit indicated that the principles of the Organ shall be the same as 
those provided in the SADC Treaty. Additionally, the communiqué emphasized that the Organ 
should be guided by the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states and that 
military intervention to stabilize or prevent intra- and interstate conflict is allowed only after all 
peaceful means have been exhausted (ibid.). The objectives of the Organ, as concluded in the 
document, pertained to the protection of the region’ people, cooperation in areas of defense and 
security, evolution of common values and promotion of democratic institutions, respecting human 
rights, development of a common foreign policy, a collective security capacity and a conflict 
prevention mechanism (early warning system), promotion of peacekeeping, promotion of the non-
military dimensions of security and conclusion of the Mutual Defence Pact (ibid.). Possible ‘punitive 
measures’ against warring parties were to be used only in case all other methods had failed, and these 
were supposed to be agreed upon in a separate Protocol. Additionally, the communiqué provided 
that: 
 
“The SADC organ on Politics, Defense and Security shall operate at the Summit level, 
and shall function independently of other SADC structures. The Organ shall also 
operate at Ministerial and technical levels. The Chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate 
on annual and on a Troika basis.” (SADC Summit Communiqué, 1996). 
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Concurrently, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which had earlier 
constituted a substructure of the FLS, became incorporated into the Organ as one of its institutions. 
Finally, the Summit elected Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe as the first chairperson of the 
Organ (ibid.). 
 
Both Nathan and Cilliers agree that the manner in which the Gaborone Communiqué was written 
and its lack of clarity in what the Organ’s ‘independency from other SADC structures’ means 
brought about many misunderstandings and tensions among the member states, in particular 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe (Cilliers, 1999; Nathan, 2006).  
 
Nathan argued that the overall establishment of the Organ was too precipitate, as a protocol that 
was supposed to regulate the structure, functions and powers of the body at a later stage and to 
replace the interim provisions of the Gaborone Communiqué, was accomplished only in 2001 and 
entered into force even later, in 2004. Additionally, the scholar emphasized that the de facto existence 
of the Organ was also questionable as: “none of its envisaged structures was set up and the Organ 
Chair did not rotate annually” (Nathan, 2006, p. 609).  
 
In the period between the official launch of the Organ and approval by the SADC Summit the 
Protocol which sought to operationalize it, a series of various meetings to negotiate its content took 
place. Notwithstanding, the SADC Summits which took place in 1998 and 1999 were not very 
successful in bringing any satisfactory solutions (Nathan, 2006, p. 610). Moreover, the year 1998 
brought contested military interventions in Lesotho and DRC, which caused further significant 
tensions among the member states. On the other hand, the need to finally operationalize the Organ 
became more urgent. Against this backdrop, negotiations were renewed with a new verve and were 
led by the Foreign Minister of Swaziland, Albert Shabangu (Nathan, 2006, p. 610). The final draft of 
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the Protocol, which was approved by the SADC Summit in August 2001, leaned toward solutions 
lobbied mainly by South Africa: the Organ was given a rather pacifist orientation, it was decided that 
it should constitute a part of the SADC and that it would be responsive to the Summit. Still, as 
Nathan concludes: “other contentious issues were finessed, ignored or left vague” (Nathan, 2006, p. 
610).  
 
The impasse around the Organ, both before and after its official establishment, was attributed by 
scholars to several factors. First of all, this was the already mentioned difference of values among 
the member states of the region and their political culture (Nathan, 2006; Cilliers; 1999). Secondly, it 
was the incompatible visions of the member states of what should be the main function and focus 
of the Organ. Laurie Nathan, for example, points out that the so-called ‘pacifist camp’, which 
comprised Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, was in favor of the Organ 
constituting a “common security regime whose primary basis for cooperation and peacemaking 
would be political rather than military” (2006, p. 610), while the ‘militarist camp’, led by Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola, championed focus on military cooperation and a responsive rather than 
preventive approach to conflicts (ibid.). Finally, the question of whether, and to what degree the 
Organ shall be independent from the SADC and responsive to it caused much tension, especially 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa31.  
 
5.2. Regional Security Arrangements in the SADC Documents 
The three documents, i.e. the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the 
Protocol), the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), 
                                                          
31 In the process of drafting the Protocol, Mandela decisively objected to the idea of the Organ being a completely 
separate body from the SADC, an idea which was championed by Mugabe, who threatened that in case a majority of 
votes would support this option, he would resign from being chair of the SADC Summit (Cilliers, 1999, p. 28; Nathan, 
2006, p. 610).  
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provide basic arrangements in relation to peace and security architecture in the Southern African 
region. Additionally, the document entitled Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections, which aims at consolidating democracy in the region, will be discussed. The document, 
despite not being binding on the member states, has a significant meaning for enforcing democracy 
and enhancing human security in the region. Therefore, this subchapter takes a closer look at those 
documents in order to elucidate their provisions as well as to scrutinize their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
5.2.1. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 
The Protocol, which was approved by the SADC Summit in 2001 and entered into power in March 
2004, determines the objectives, structure, functions and procedures of the Organ. The general 
objective of the Organ is “to promote peace and security in the Region” ([Art. 2], 2001, SADC). 
Specific objectives described in the Protocol, despite being formulated differently in some instances, 
are similar to those already encapsulated in the Gaborone Communiqué which established the body. 
What is important is that the Protocol specified the obligations, jurisdiction and methods of the 
Organ pertaining to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts [Art. 11]. It anticipates 
resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, such as “preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, 
mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by international tribunal” [Art. 11(3a)], and 
only if those methods fail, enforcement action may be considered. The Organ was given a mandate 
to intervene: 
1) in case of significant inter-state conflict taking place between the member states of the 
SADC or between a member and non-member state of the SADC [Art 11(2a)].  
2) in case of significant intra-state conflict taking place in an SADC member state’s territory 
[Art 11(2b)]. 
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In the second case, genocide, ethnic cleansing, gross violations of human rights, military coups, civil 
war, insurgency, as well as any other conflict endangering stability in the region is considered to be a 
‘significant conflict’. The decision to give the Organ and the SADC the right to intervene in grave 
circumstances into the affairs of sovereign and independent states is in line with the already 
discussed concept of R2P and testifies that an understanding of the notion of ‘security’ among the 
SADC leaders is not confined to the security of a state only, but that it also encompasses human 
security.  
 
The structures set up by the Protocol encompass the position of the Chairperson, the Troika, the 
Ministerial Committee, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Inter-
State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) [Art. 3(2)]. As was already hinted, the SADC leaders 
decided to make the Organ responsible to the SADC Summit [Art. 3(1)].  
 
The Troika comprises the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson (also known as the Incoming 
Chair), and the Outgoing Chairperson ([Art. 3(3)], 2001, SADC), who are elected by the SADC 
Summit. Currently, these positions are held, respectively, by Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, President of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, President Hifikepunye Pohamba of the Republic of Namibia and 
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the Republic of Angola (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2012). 
The Chairperson is responsible for the “overall policy direction and the achievement of the 
objectives of the Organ” ([Art. 4(4)], 2001, SADC). 
 
The Ministerial Committee, which is responsible for “coordination of the work of the Organ and its 
structures” ([Art. 5(2)], 2001, SADC), consists of ministers of foreign affairs, public security and 
defense from each member state. The Ministerial Committee should be chaired by the minister of 
the same country from which the Chairperson of the Organ is, and to whom the Committee is in 
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general responsible. The Ministerial Committee is obliged to convene at least one meeting a year 
([Art. 5(1-5)], 2001, SADC). 
 
The ISPDC, which comprises the ministers of foreign affairs of each member state, holds 
responsibility for achieving objectives which are related to politics and diplomacy. The ISDSC, 
which is a more developed body than the previously constituted substructure of FLS, comprises the 
ministers of defense, public and state security, and aims at achieving objectives connected with 
defense and security. Both institutions should be chaired by ministers from the country of the 
Organ’s Chairperson and rotate annually. Both are also required to have at least one meeting per 
year, and shall regularly report to the Ministerial Committee and the Chairperson. ([Art. 5-6], 2001, 
SADC). 
 
The Organ does not have its own Secretariat, as it was decided that those services are to be provided 
by the SADC Secretariat. Later, in 2004, it was specified that those functions shall be fulfilled by the 
newly established body, the Department for Politics, Defence and Security, which is to be located 
within the SADC Secretariat. The Department comprises three sub-divisions, the: 1) Directorate for 
Politics and Diplomacy, 2) Directorate for Defence and Security, and 3) Strategic Analysis Unit 
(SADC, 2004a, p. 48). 
 
5.2.2. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ 
The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), approved by the community in 2003 and 
adopted in 2004 (Nathan, 2006, p. 610; van Nieuwkerk, 2012, p. 5), is an ambitious document which 
outlines the strategies and activities for the Organ, with the ultimate aim of achieving the objectives 
encapsulated in the Protocol. Hence, it seeks to provide “the institutional framework for the day to 
day implementation of the activities of the Organ” (SADC, 2004a, p. 6). Besides, the SIPO 
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implementation aims at aligning the policies of the SADC and the AU in the areas of peace and 
security. The document was expected to guide the Organ for a period of five years, after which it 
was supposed to be reviewed. The revised version of the document was approved by the SADC 
Summit only in August 2010 (van Nieuwkerk, 2012, p. 11), however, until now (September 2012) it 
has not been released to the public. Van Nieuwkerk assumes that most probably implementation of 
the SIPO II is also lagging32 (ibid., p. 5).  
 
Paulino Macaringue and Shirley Magano argue that in spite of the document being very ambitious, it 
inescapably faces many challenges connected with its operationalization and implementation due to 
the way it was formulated (2008). The authors point out that the SIPO, similarly to every strategic 
document, shall include components such as “vision, mission, values, lines of business, strategic 
issues, goals (based on outcomes); objectives and performance measures; and implementing, 
monitoring and reporting aspects” (2008, p.137). On the contrary, goals in the SIPO are confused 
with objectives, strategies with activities, the division of labor and line of responsibilities are 
ambiguous, and the document does not provide any milestones to be reached and against which the 
achievements of the Organ could be judged (ibid., p. 137). In the words of Macaringue and Magano, 
“most of [the SIPO] components are ill defined with no measurable outputs” (ibid., p. 135). 
Moreover, the authors noticed that although the SIPO is said to constitute an element of a wider 
developmental strategy encapsulated in the RISDP, the documents “hardly talk to each other” (ibid., 
p. 142). 
 
Notwithstanding, van Nieuwkerk shows that implementation of the SIPO has been successful in 
several aspects: introduction of the Mutual Defence Pact, the successful launch of the SADC 
                                                          
32 Van Nieuwkerk reports that SIPO II is formulated similarly to SIPO I. The author mentions that the two documents 
differ in two respects: SIPO II distinguishes five sectors of cooperation, while SIPO I singled out only four. Besides, 
SIPO II gives more attention to evaluating and monitoring the Organ’s activity (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012, p. 16). 
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Standby Force, the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization’s 
(SARPCCO) integration into the ISDSC, as well as establishment of the Regional Early Warning 
Center (REWC) and the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (2012, p. 10). Additionally, the scholar 
argues that increased cooperation pertaining to the sensitive sector of security helped to boost 
mutual trust and confidence among the member states of the SADC (ibid., p.10).  
 
However, the key to success for both the SIPO and the Organ in achieving the intended objectives 
still remains the will of the political leaders and key stakeholders. This was clearly recognized and 
emphasized in the SIPO:  
 
“Political commitment is the linchpin and fundamental ingredient underlying all stages 
of the implementation of the SIPO. Member States have to uphold the principles and 
objectives of the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation as they implement the SIPO” (SADC, 2004a, p. 43). 
 
However, some of the SADC’s principles have arguably not yet been internalized by individual 
member states. Also the will is often not yet present on the ground. By way of example, Van 
Nieuwkerk claims the following:  
 
“Despite SADC’s sophisticated security architecture (….) the behaviour of its 
members suggests that they are not yet willing or able to share democratic political 
values and norms, or harmonise national decision-making structures and practices in 
order to enhance SADC’s ability or authority to make, implement, and enforce rules.” 
(Nieuwkerk, 2012, p. 20). 
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To sum up, although the SIPO provided strategies and activities for the Organ, it did not outline any 
specific systematic plan that would prioritize their implementation. The SADC’s limited budget as 
well as logistics in general excludes the possibility of implementing all of the strategies at once, 
therefore, such a prioritization would be crucial for its effectiveness. Moreover, to fairly assess this 
effectiveness, measurable outcomes need to be determined against which a regular evaluation could 
be carried out.  
 
5.2.3. The Mutual Defence Pact 
The Mutual Defence Pact (thereafter: MDP) is the SADC’s document which aims at 
operationalizing “mechanisms of the Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters” 
([Art. 2], 2003, SADC). More specifically, the document deals with “defence co-operation and with 
collective action in response to an armed attack” (Nathan, 2006, p. 610). The MDP was approved by 
the SADC Summit in July 2003, and by July 2011 it was ratified by all but two states33 (SADC, 2011, 
p. 11-12).  
 
 The MDP reiterates the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and territorial 
integrity [Art. 7(2)] as well as the resolutions of the Protocol stating that conflicts between member 
states shall be solved in a peaceful manner [Art. 3; Art. 13]. It also confirms the Organ’s mandate to 
mediate in case of conflicts between state parties [Art. 5]. Furthermore, it seeks to curb actions 
carried out by individual member states without the consent of the SADC Summit [Art. 7(2)]. This 
provision possibly aims at preventing future situations, such as the one from 1998 when Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia decided to deploy troops to DRC, which was contested by the other member 
states of the SADC. The pact also envisions cooperation of state parties in the form of joint military 
                                                          
33 Those states are DRC and Malawi. Madagascar was not taken into account as it has been suspended from 
the community after the coup d’état in 2009. The MDP entered into force on August 17, 2008 (SADC, 2011, p. 11-
12). 
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trainings, military intelligence and information exchange as well as collaborative research, 
development and production of military equipment [Art. 9]. Article 6 of the MDP, entitled Collective 
Self-Defence and Collective Action, which arguably constitutes the core of the pact, provides that “[a]n 
armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and 
such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action” ([Art.6(1)], 2003, SADC). However, 
the same article provides that “[e]ach State Party shall participate in such collective action in any 
manner it deems appropriate” [Art. 6(3)], 2003, SADC). As is pointed out by Sadiki Maeresera, this 
leads to the situation where “parties have the option of choosing how to respond to a call for 
immediate action, presumably including the classic ‘do nothing’ policy option” (2008, p. 126).  
 
Laurie Nathan argues that this version of the ‘watered down’ pact is the result of a low level of trust 
as well as a lack of affinity and unity among the member states (2006, p. 615). Naison Ngoma, to the 
contrary, perceives the conclusion of the MDP as the expression of a high level of trust among the 
member states, claiming that “the attainment of a mutual defence pact is the ultimate achievement, 
which would equate to the mature level in Adler and Barnett’s formulation of a security community” 
(2003, p. 25). The author maintains that especially Article 13 of the MDP on the peaceful settlement 
of disputes between the SADC’s member states “assures that member states would no longer target 
each other militarily – a critical factor of a security community” (ibid., p. 25). Whether Ngoma is 
correct in his judgments remains to be seen. 
 
Thus far, challenges to security in the region mainly stem from intrastate, not interstate conflicts. 
A valid exception was the situation between Zambia and Angola in 2000, when the latter accused 
the former of supporting subversive actions on Angola’s territory. However, those disputes never 
turned into a full-blown military conflict. 
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More disturbing was, however, the quite recent statement of the Tanzanian Committee Chairman, 
Mr. Edward Lowassa, on the ongoing disputes between Tanzania and Malawi over the waters of 
Lake Malawi. Mr. Lowassa declared that Tanzania is “satisfied with progress being made by the 
government on the diplomatic front but also military preparations must be made to make sure that 
all options are available when it comes to making the final decision” (quoted in: Simbeye, 2012). 
Tanzanian officials also informed that military forces were ready to act in case the diplomatic 
solutions failed (ibid.). However, a week after Mr. Lowassa’s statement, the newly elected president 
of Malawi, Ms. Joyce Banda, declared in an amicable tone that “[e]ven if the diplomatic route fails, it 
does not necessarily mean we will go to war with our brothers and sisters in Tanzania, because we 
can resort to other channels to solve the matter” (Anonymous, 2012a). Assumably, Ms. Banda had 
in mind mediation through either SADC or AU. Thus far, five-days-long talks between the two 
countries, which started on August 20, ended in a deadlock (Anonymous, 2012b), and another 
meeting of the officials was scheduled for September. In spite of the Tanzanian President’s 
assurance that his country also wished to solve the conflict amicably through diplomatic means 
(Anonymous, 2012c), thus far both parties seem to be far from finding a negotiable solution. 
Interestingly enough, so far neither Tanzania nor Malawi have asked the SADC to mediate between 
the parties, nor did the SADC itself offer such a possibility34. It would be interesting to observe what 
stance the SADC takes if the disputes between the two member states escalate, and whether Ngoma 
was correct in his assumptions.  
 
5.2.4. The Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections 
The last document discussed in this chapter – the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections – is distinct from the others discussed as it is has the form of a declaration, and as such it 
                                                          
34 The conflict was neither tackled in any way during the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in August 
2012 nor mentioned in the communiqué of the Organ Troika Summit which took place on September 4.  
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is not binding on the member states. The document, which was adopted by the SADC Summit in 
August 2004, firstly outlines the principles for the conduct of a democratic election35 and thereafter 
delineates in detail the mandate of the SADC Electoral Observation Missions (SEOM) as well as the 
responsibilities of the states holding the elections. 
 
Those principles and guidelines have the invaluable potential of hastening the democratization 
process. This is especially the case because of its regional character. Often the winning party 
manages to rule without many obstacles (but not infrequently with much terror), despite the 
doubtful election process and the lack of popular support among citizens. However, if the party is 
not legitimized through the election process at the regional level, i.e. because the elections have been 
proclaimed null and void by the regional body, the situation of the winning party is significantly 
different, as the diplomatic, political and economic relations between the county and other members 
may be considerably shattered.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the document’s potential in enforcing democratization in the region, in reality 
it may be considered as rather weak. Gina van Schalkwyk notices that the shortages of the document 
relate to the optional character of inviting the SEOM (the countries are not obliged to do so if they 
do not wish it), as well as to the fact that there are no punitive measures anticipated if a state fails to 
meet the guidelines (2005, p. 36). In addition, Khabele Matlosa observes that the content of the 
document focuses, to a great extent, on observation of the election and not, as its title would indicate, 
on election management. As such it resembles more an “election observation guide than an election 
management guide” (Matlosa, 2005, p. 6). Finally, Matlosa takes note that “all the SADC election 
observer missions are put together by the troika governing the SADC OPDS [Organ]” (2005, p. 6). 
                                                          
35 Among those principles one can find: full participation of citizens, tolerance, regularity in holding elections, equal 
access to the media by competing parties, equal right to vote, impartiality of the judiciary and electoral commissions 
(SADC, 2004b). 
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In this situation, doubts about the impartiality of the observers may be raised, especially if the 
Chairperson comes from the country where the elections are to be held.  
 
It also has to be remembered that the legitimization power of the SEOM (as well as  the other 
observation missions) brings about the danger that flawed or partly flawed elections will be 
nonetheless endorsed, which may not be very favorable for the consolidation of democracy. In 
addition, the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections have a rather discretionary character, 
i.e. the document does not provide the exact benchmarks as to when elections are flawed to the 
point that they cannot be considered as free and fair. By way of example, the recent general elections 
held in Angola (August 31, 2012) were approved by the SEOM as being “credible, peaceful and 
transparent”, despite the many concerns raised by Angolan civil society groups and the opposition36. 
To be fair, however, the SEOM also raised some concerns about certain parts of the election 
process. Nonetheless, according to observers the elections were “not of such magnitude as to affect 
the credibility of the overall electoral process” (SEOM, 2012, p. 10)37. On the other hand, the 
SEOM, when observing run-off presidential elections in Zimbabwe in June 2008, harshly criticized 
the country for its conduct and declared that “[t]he Mission is of the view that the prevailing 
environment impinged on the credibility of the electoral process. The elections did not represent the 
will of the people of Zimbabwe” as “[t]he pre-election phase was characterized by politically 
motivated violence, intimidation, and displacements” and “[t]he process leading up to the 
presidential run-off elections held on June 27, 2008 did not conform to the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections” (SEOM, 2008, p. 6). However, as already mentioned, the 
                                                          
36 The main concerns pertained to the delay in making the voting lists public, the presence of many “ghost votes“ on 
them and the absence of those who were entitled to vote, unequal access to the media by competing parties (Redvers, 
2012) as well as refusal of accreditation to the opposition party to monitor the voting and counting process 
(Anonymous, 2012d). 
37 It needs to be mentioned, however, that the Angolan General Elections were also approved as generally free and fair 
by AU, EU and the United States.  
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SADC largely remains toothless, as it did not anticipate any punitive measures toward countries 
which did not meet the criteria concluded in the guidelines.  
 
In conclusion, the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections are the right step toward 
enforcing democracy in the region, but the document should be empowered by becoming legally 
biding on the SADC’s member states and by making it obligatory for the SADC member states to 
invite SEOMs every time elections are being held in the region. Only if that is done it will be given 
the potential to truly boost democracy in the region. Naturally, this may be hard to execute, as it 
would surely be met with strong opposition of the states because it infringes on their sovereignty.  
 
5.3. Pillars of the SADC’s Peace and Security Architecture 
The SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) and the Early Warning System are mechanisms erected 
by the SADC with the aim of prevention, management and resolution of potential conflicts. They 
are, however, not only a part of the SADC peace and security architecture, but also a continental 
project of the AU. This chapter will look at the process of their establishment, the level of 
operationalization as well as their functioning and objectives. This subchapter does not aim to do an 
in-depth assessment of the structures, but rather to provide basic information on its status, aim and 
mandate. It needs to be mentioned that research on the Standby Brigade and the SADC Early 
Warning System in particular is inhibited due to confidentiality of most of the documents and 
reports connected with the topic. 
 
5.3.1. Early Warning System 
The SADC’s early warning system (SADC EWS) constitutes a part of one of the pillars of AU’s 
peace and security architecture, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). As such, swift and 
transparent performance of the SADC’s mechanism is crucial for a successful functioning of the 
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whole continental network. The establishment of an early warning system in the Southern African 
region was already provisioned in 2001 by the Protocol, which states that “the Organ shall establish 
an early warning system in order to facilitate timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation 
of conflict” ([Art. 11(3c)], 2001, SADC]. However, similarly as most of the other SADC projects, 
this one also took a long time for the community to establish.  
 
SADC EWS is designed to comprise the Regional Early Warning Center (REWC) based in 
Gaborone and the National Early Warning Centers (NEWCs) in each of the SADC member states 
(AU, 2008b, p. 21). The AU’s publication on operationalization of early warning systems expected 
the REWS to be launched in the first quarter of 2007 (AU, 2008b, p. 23). However, the REWC was 
successfully launched only on July 20, 2010 and it still needs to be connected with the NEWCs 
(Anonymous, 2010a)38. As was already mentioned, research on the SADC EWS is relatively difficult 
as the SADC does not publish its documents on the process of establishment and operationalization 
of the mechanism. Nonetheless, other sources indicate that the delay may be caused partly due to 
financial reasons, as equipment for the center was supposed to be procured gradually due to its high 
costs (AU, 2008b, p. 23).  
 
As for the scope of the SADC EWS’s activity, it primarily aims at preventing conflicts in the region. 
However, as Cilliers points out, “[p]ractically, the interpretation of the mandate does (…) appear to 
go beyond a legalistic and narrow view, including issues such as natural disasters, drugs, small arms 
trafficking, disease, food security and ‘foreign interference’ within its purview” (Cilliers, 2005, p. 17). 
By way of example, the community owns an advanced mechanism responsible for monitoring food 
                                                          
38 Various sources dealing with the status of the SADC EWS provide inconsistent information on whether NEWCs 
have already been established in all of the SADC member states’ territories. 
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security in the region – the Regional Early Warning Unit. Similarly to the SADC EWS’s structure, it 
is complemented by National Early Warning Units in the territories of SADC’s countries39. 
 
Criticism of the SADC EWS is related to its structure and methods of collecting information. The 
SADC EWS is not harmonized with AU’s standards, as it is “highly linked with the intelligence 
community in the region” (Tiruneh, 2010, p. 19). As such, data gathered by the SADC EWS as well 
as information on its establishment and operationalization are considered to be highly confidential. 
At the same time, CEWS, with which SADC EWS is supposed to be harmonized, is envisaged to be 
“an open-source system where information in gathered from a variety of different sources, 
including, inter alia, governmental and inter-governmental actors, international and non-
governmental organizations, the media, academia and think-thanks” (Wane et al., 2010, p. 93).  
 
All in all, due to constraints related to confidentiality of all aspects of the SADC EWS’s functioning, 
it is difficult to access how and what kind of information from the region is to be collected, 
processed and, what is most important, used in practice.  
 
5.3.2. SADC Standby Force  
Similarly to the SADC EWS, the SADC Standby Force (SADCBRIG) constitutes not only a part of 
the SADC peace and security architecture, but also the AU’s continental project. The SADCBRIG 
was launched on August 17, 2007 in Lusaka during the opening ceremony of the SADC Summit 
(Vreӱ, 2009, p. 63), where also the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Southern 
African Development Community Standby Brigade (MoU) was signed (Madakufamba, 2007). 
                                                          
39 The mechanism responsible for monitoring food security in the SADC region is known as the SADC Regional Early 
Warning System (it comprises the Regional Early Warning Unit [REWU] and National Early Warning Units 
[NEWUs]) (SADC, 1998, p. ii) and should not be confused with the mechanism responsible for conflict prevention, 
which is also often referred to in publications as the ‘Regional Early Warning System’. Relations between the two 
mechanisms require further research. 
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The MoU, which seeks to provide a legal basis for SADCBRIG operationalization [Art. 2] defines, 
among others, the functions, structures and rules for deployment of the body. According to the 
document, the SADC Standby Force shall participate in observations and monitoring missions as 
well as peace support missions. It may also be deployed on the territory of the state party to the 
MoU in case of grave circumstances or in order to restore peace and security. Furthermore, 
intervention may be requested by a state party itself. In addition, the brigade can be deployed in 
order to prevent a conflict in the region from escalating or spreading to other areas. Finally, the 
MoU envisions the possibility of the brigade’s utilization in post-conflict phases to facilitate 
demobilization or disarmament [Art. 4]. 
 
The SADCBRIG may be deployed on mandate of either the SADC itself as well as of the AU or the 
UN ([Art. 7(2)], 2007, SADC). Nonetheless, there is some skepticism about the feasible deployment 
of troops on the SADC mandate due to severe splits within the community pertaining to preferable 
policy responses to conflicts by the individual member states (Baker & Maeresera, 2009, p. 108). 
Most often, scholars tend to recall the divisions within the SADC caused by the military deployment 
in DRC and Lesotho in 1998, concluding that the lack of shared values and different national 
interests may also hinder the rapid deployment of troops in the future (ibid., p. 108-109). 
Additionally, the SADC exhibits many features of an inter-governmental organization, where the 
main decision-making power is hijacked by the heads of state and government of the region. Against 
this backdrop Thomas Mandrup accurately observes that “[o]ne of the problems of having a security 
structure within the SADC structure is that it relies on states to solve problems between states, even 
though many of these states constitute the very problem” (2009, p. 11). The author’s observation 
holds true not only in relation to the SADCBRIG, but also for all other structures established by the 
community to manage peace and security in the region. 
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As for the SADCBRIG’s structure, it shall comprise military, police and civilian components ([Art. 
3], 2007, SADC) which are to be provided by the state parties. The allotted troops will stay in “their 
countries of origin at an ‘on call’ level of alert for the duration for the duration of the assignment” 
(Baker & Maeresera, 2009, p. 107). What is more, they need to remain on the stand-by mode at all 
times and cannot be delegated to other tasks (Mandrup, 2009, p. 16). The MoU also provides for the 
establishment of an SADC Planning Element and Main Logistics Depot [Art. 6 and Art. 9], which 
are to be the only standing permanent SADCBRIG structure.  
 
Jakkie Cilliers and Johann Pottgieter note that the SADCBRIG has made significant progress since 
its establishment: it managed to accomplish its doctrine, operational guidelines for the brigade, 
standard operating procedures as well as logistic concepts. Besides, it verified readiness of the troops 
as pledged by the SADC’s member states (2010, p. 134). On the other hand, the challenges which 
still needed to be met in 2010 encompassed: “(1) additional forces on standby are required (…), (2) 
finalization of the standby concept and roster, (3) funding, (4) logistic support and location of the 
depot, (5) operationalization of an early warning system, (6) interoperability (…), (6) effective 
coordination and communication, and, (7) capacity building, especially in a civilian component” 
(Cilliers & Pottgieter, 2010, p. 134). 
 
Another complication in erecting a swiftly working standby brigade is the overlapping membership 
of some states in various RECs (Cilliers & Pottgieter, 2010; Mandrup, 2009, p. 4), e.g. Angola and 
DRC remain to be the members of both the SADC and ECCAS (Cilliers & Pottgieter, 2010, p. 135). 
It is not clear whether in this case the state needs to decide in which regional ASF project it wishes 
to become engaged or whether it needs to become involved in both of them and risk resources and 
financial overstretch. Moreover, the sensitiveness of the SADC’s states over sovereignty and lack of 
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mutual trust leads to situations when the SADC’s officials are not permitted to inspect the pledged 
military capabilities of individual states (Mandrup, 2009. p. 15). The same jealousy over sovereignty 
and sensitiveness over security arrangements in general stopped the SADC from harnessing the 
benefits of donors’ support. However, as Cilliers and Pottgieter point out, this situation also has a 
positive aspect, as it strengthened the feeling of ownership by the community over the standby 
brigade project, which was identified to be a serious problem in the case of standby forces of the 
other regional communities (2010, p. 140). 
 
Not infrequently do scholars point to the special role held by the regional power, South Africa, in 
erecting a swiftly working regional Standby Force. South Africa has not only the most extensive 
experience of all the countries in the region when it comes to peacekeeping and peacemaking 
operations (ICG, 2012), but also due to its level of economic development it has capabilities to 
provide resources “to fill the gaps of the other member states” (Mandrup, 2009, p. 19). Thomas 
Mandrup emphasizes the country’s importance in the establishment and operationalization of the 
ASF in general and of the SADCBRIG in particular (ibid., p. 18). Nonetheless, South Africa remains 
very careful when imposing its solutions onto the other members of the SADC, as it does not want 
to be perceived (due to reasons discussed elsewhere) as a regional hegemon (ICG, 2012). As 
Mandrup notices “(…) co-operation and especially contributions in SADCBRIG, is described as 
joint SADC, when South Africa in reality is often the main provider” (ibid., p. 20). 
 
5.3.3. Mediation Unit and Panel of Elders 
The SADC has also expressed its willingness to establish two additional mechanisms, the Mediation 
Unit and the Panel of Elders, that would strengthen the community’s ability in areas of diplomacy 
and conflict prevention. The Mediation Unit, although not operational yet, has already fully finalized 
its frameworks (ICG, 2012, p. 13). It is supposed to be led by the Panel of Elders, which consists of 
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former leaders and prominent persons from the region and shall be “supported by a mediation 
reference group (MRG) and administered by a mediation support unit (MSU)” (ibid., pp. 13-14). As 
will be evident from Chapter Six, which discusses crisis management as led by the SADC, this can 
empower the SADC in a significant way as it will allow the community to be perceived as more 
impartial while leading negotiations. Additionally, the creation of a Mediation Unit will tackle an 
aspect of the mediations that has so far been neglected but is important, the participation of civil 
society, because “technical teams will ideally comprise experts and not exclusively politicians and 
their appointees” (ibid., p. 14). The details of the structures’ operationalization, however, remain so 
far unknown, as the SADC labeled its development as a “strategic” priority area, therefore, deciding 
not to involve external partners such as academics or civil society in its very development (ibid.).  
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Chapter Six: Regional Conflicts and the SADC’s Responses  
The two previous chapters of this thesis aimed at analysis of the level of institutional development 
of the SADC and its peace and security architecture respectively. Undoubtedly, the community has 
gone through a long and bumpy road to create a working peace and security architecture since its 
establishment in 1992. Only recently it managed to launch the last provisioned element of its 
architecture, Early Warning System (EWS). Nonetheless, many details of its functioning and 
deployment must still be worked out. The SADC, however, shall not be assessed according to the 
level of institutional development only, it also needs to be judged against its performance pertaining 
to its conflict solution capacity and effectiveness of preventive diplomacy. Therefore, this chapter 
examines the SADC’s role in resolutions of regional conflicts and crises in the region.  
 
The SADC took upon itself a responsibility to mediate in conflicts or, if needed, to take more 
decisive stances, even when its architecture was still in its infancy. It sought, among other tasks, to 
resolve militarily conflicts in DRC and Lesotho in 1998, which led to a significant split between its 
members. As those conflicts, their outcomes and the role of the SADC have already been analyzed 
in-depth by many scholars,40 this chapter will focus on more recent conflicts and crises.41 Namely, it 
focuses on the ongoing political tensions in Madagascar and Zimbabwe, where the SADC and its 
Organ are actively searching for sustainable solutions through negotiation efforts. It also investigates 
the tense situation in Swaziland, which has the potential to evolve into full-blown conflict, as basic 
political and human rights of its citizens are neglected but on which the community remains 
worryingly muted.  
 
 
                                                          
40 See for example: Berman E. G., Sams, K. E. (2003) The Peacekeeping Potential of African Regional Organizations. In: 
Dealing with Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organizations. Ed. Boulden, J. Palgrave Macmillan.  
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6.1. Madagascar 
Madagascar has been a member of the SADC since August 2005, when it was admitted as the 14th 
country of the community (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2005). However, the country enjoyed only 
four years of fully-fledged membership in the SADC, as in March 2009 the Extraordinary Summit of 
SADC Heads of State and Government decided to suspend the country from the community. That 
was a response of the community to the ousting of the Malagasy president Marc Ravalomanana by 
the Mayor of the country’s capital city Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina on March 17, 2009. The 
SADC Summit decided Madagascar should be suspended from the community until “the return of 
the Country to constitutional normalcy” (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2009a). Since that time, the 
SADC together with other prominent international organizations remains active in a search for the 
solution to the conflict, which has lasted for over three years currently. This subchapter examines 
the stance and role of the SADC in resolving this conflict.  
 
The Malagasy conflict has its proximate cause in tensions that arose between Marc Ravalomanana, 
the president of the country since 2002, and Andry Rajoelina, which fulfilled the function of the 
Antananarivo’s Mayor. The situation started to deteriorate gradually starting with 2007, when the 
leader of president’s party - Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM) - lost mayoral elections in favor of young 
Rajoelina. According to the report of the Congressional Research Service, the animosity between the 
two leaders was manifested for example by delays of Ravalomanana’s government in the “disbursal 
of funds for various local government infrastructure projects in the capital, diverted investments 
from the city and (…) [reluctance in] co-operation between the central and municipal governments” 
(Ploch & Cook, 2012, p. 9). However, the situation between the two leaders became irrevocable 
after Ravalomanana decided to close Rajoelina’s TV channel, which broadcasted the interview with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
41 This chapter does not address military intervention in Lesotho and DRC due to two reasons: firstly, the topics have 
been exhaustively analyzed by other scholars and secondly, this thesis aims at analysis of SADC recent undertakings, 
and not those which took place when the SADC peace and security architecture was still in its infancy. 
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the former president of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka. Ravalomanana’s refusal to re-open the 
channel, added to the general dissatisfaction over his presidency, caused many anti-governmental 
demonstrations in the capital (ibid., p. 10)42. Demonstrations, which endured with different intensity 
from mid-January until March 2009, were in many instances violently repressed. Many people died 
as a result of state repressions on demonstrators, though also because of the general unrest, mostly 
due to “crowd stampedes and arson” (ibid., p. 10).  
 
The military which had historically remained neutral, over the prolonged instability, became more 
supportive toward Rajoelina. Subsequently, when president Ravalomanana decided to resign and 
handed over the power to the military on March 17, it transferred the authority to Rajoelina 
justifying that “a popular uprising had taken place and a legitimate government already existed” 
(Cawthra, 2010, p. 14). The SADC was of different opinion however, and in its communiqué from 
the Extraordinary SADC Summit suspended Madagascar’s membership in the community 
announcing “The Extraordinary Summit decided not to recognize Mr. Rajoelina as President of 
Madagascar as his appointment did not only violate the Constitution of Madagascar and democratic 
principles, but also violated the core principles and values of the SADC Treaty, the African Union 
Constitutive Act and the United Nations Charter.” (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2009a). 
Furthermore, the SADC emphasized that “the return of the constitutional order” in Madagascar 
should happened through “unconditional reinstatement of President Ravalomanana” (ibid.). The 
country was suspended also from membership in the AU until constitutional order was restored 
(PSC Communiqué, 2009). However, the AU in contrast to the SADC did not imply necessity of 
reinstating Ravalomanana as the only way out, but remained open also to other resolutions. 
 
                                                          
42 Gawin Cawthra in addition to previously mentioned causes of the conflict mentions also the general failure in 
consolidation of democracy in Madagascar’s history since independence as well as marginalization of military and 
security services (2010, p. 16).  
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The role of the SADC as an actor in negotiating political transition in Madagascar needs to be seen 
in a wider context, as its efforts to restore order in the country were conjoined with those of others 
international organizations. More specifically, the AU created International Contact Group (ICG) on 
Madagascar, through which it coordinated efforts to resolve the conflict, to which belonged among 
others the AU, the SADC, the COMESA, the UNSC, the EU, the Organisation internationale de la 
Franophonie (OIF) (Ploch & Cook, 2012, p. 12).  
 
As Gavin Cawthra (2010) points out, the SADC got involved in efforts of managing the political 
crisis at an early stage of the conflict, as already in February 2009 the Swazi foreign minister visited 
Madagascar. The SADC’s Organ was also quick to react; it issued a statement condemning 
unconstitutional changes even before the AU and the SADC Summit, two days after Rajoelina 
seized power (ibid., p. 19). The Organ at first considered the possibility of military intervention in 
Madagascar through SADCBRIG – an option supported by the COMESA and Swaziland (ibid., p. 
20). However, at the later stage in May 2009, the community realized its position of both military 
intervention and the reinstatement of Ravalomanana was “untenable in terms of realities on the 
ground, and out of phase with that of other international actors” (ibid., p. 20). 
 
In short, the SADC was obliged to modify its strategy, if it wanted to play any relevant role in 
solving the conflict, and avoid becoming a by-stander to the situation taking place in its own 
backyard. To strengthen its position, the SADC decided to work closely with other actors involved 
in negotiating transition in Madagascar and in June appointed the former president of Mozambique 
Joaquim Chissano to lead mediations (SADC Summit Communiqué, 2009b). Chissano in early 
August managed to conduct a meeting of four Malagasy leaders: Ravalomanana, Rajoelina, as well as 
two former presidents of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. The parties came to the 
agreement that the transitional government shall be established for the period of fifteen months that 
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would prepare the country for democratic elections (Ploch & Cook, 2012, p. 13). The agreement, 
however, was soon violated by Rajoelina and in October 2009 another meeting was convened. 
During this second meeting, Rajoelina agreed to make some concessions pertaining to his 
unilaterally-established government. Nonetheless, as was the case earlier, he violated conditions of 
the agreement at the later stage by “rationing it by implementing the articles that he sees as serving 
in his favor” (Cawthra, 2010, p. 21). The year 2010 did not bring about any breakthrough either. 
Negotiations led by international actors became less zealous and enthusiastic: the AU passed the 
stick to the SADC and the UN mandate expired (Ploch & Cook, 2012, p. 13). International actors 
counted on Madagascar’s leader will finally giving up without international aid and so suspended 
funds, as the economy of the country was deteriorating. It is believed that mainly for this reason 
Rajoelina decided to renew his talks with Ravalomanana and become more willing to compromise at 
the beginning of 2011 (Larbuisson, 2011).  
 
The SADC, once again, took a more active stance and became the main negotiator. The negotiations 
over the transition roadmap endured until September 2011, during which complicated political 
bargaining aiming at reaching sustainable power balance in the government took place43. In 
September the transitional roadmap was signed by representatives of Madagascar’s ten main political 
parties (out of eleven), and a month later the timetable for implementation of the roadmap was also 
agreed (Ploch & Cook, 2012, p. 14). Lauren Ploch and Nicolas Cook, despite citing some significant 
successes in implementing the roadmap (appointment of prime minister, cabinet, legislature and 
electoral commission; adoption of provisional electoral timetable; and passage of amnesty law), 
emphasize that overall “environment remains volatile” (ibid., p. 1). It remained that the most 
contentious issues were not solved, causing another deadlock. First of all, Ravalomanana during the 
whole period of conflict remained outside the country. His return was complicated by the fact that 
                                                          
43 For details of this political bargaining see: Madagascar: From Crisis to Transition. C. Larbuisson. May 16, 2011. 
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Rajoelina’s government decided to sentence him in August 2010 for lifetime imprisonment and 
labors, as he was found to be responsible for violent attacks on protesters in February 2009 (Ploch 
& Cook, 2012, p. 3). One of the negotiated provisions by the SADC in the transitional roadmap 
assumes passage of amnesty law, with the aim of allowing Ravalomanana’s return to the country and 
ultimately taking part in elections. However, the law that was indeed passed in April 2012 is 
formulated in such a way which excludes Ravalomanana to profit from it44 while still complying with 
the SADC’s demands (ibid., p. 3). At the same time, Rajoelina withdrew his promises of not taking 
part in future elections. The most recent talks conveyed by the SADC between Ravalomanana and 
Rajoelina (Ratsiraka and Zafy were not invited) on July 24-25, 2012 in Seychelles also did not bring 
any significant changes and the SADC’s press statement on the meeting concluded only that “the 
two leaders should reconvene to conclude on the outstanding issues stemming from the 
implementation of the Roadmap” (SADC Troika Press Statement, 2012). After three years of 
political impasse the situation in Madagascar still seems to be far from being solved.  
 
The political conflict in Madagascar brings about a significant headache to the SADC leaders: while 
the community tries to facilitate the transition, it naturally cannot impose the solution from above 
on the sovereign country. The presidential elections in Madagascar have been scheduled for May 
2013,45 however the conditions for holding free and fair democratic elections are absent in the 
country. The situation is even more complicated if one takes into account that the SADC 
involvement is perceived by many Malagasy people (with Rajoelina at the forefront) as interfering 
into internal affairs of a sovereign country. Besides, the initial tough stance of the community on 
restoring Ravalomanana to power highlighted the question of whether its position was not lead by 
                                                          
44 The amnesty law does not cover individuals who committed crimes against humanity, such as genocide, war crimes 
and serious violations of human rights. As such, according to Malagasy judicature Ravalomanana shall not be 
encompassed by blanket amnesty law (Newmarch, 2012). 
45 This information was made public by Rajoelina during his speech at the UN’s 67th General Assembly on September  
26, 2012. 
 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
85 
the mere feeling of solidarity among the SADC’s leaders (Cawthra, 2010, p. 22). It also needs to be 
mentioned that the SADC’s position on how to best solve the conflict has changed over time, 
making it difficult to trace internal logics of the whole process of negotiations46. 
 
The SADC found itself in between the proverbial rock and a hard place, as most of the roadmap’s 
negotiated provisions have been implemented, but the outstanding issues are too serious for the 
community to ignore. If the elections in Madagascar will indeed be held without Ravalomanana’s 
participation, the SADC will have to make up its mind whether it should endorse the elections and 
grant legitimacy to the new government. On the other hand, if both of the leaders participate, the 
community must ensure the credibility of elections by providing enough resources and sending a 
strong observing mission. Finally, the community must be aware that if it endorses the elections as 
free and fair, it will be its duty to help the country to recover from economic crisis. While it is in 
general commendable for the SADC to become an active negotiator in the conflict, it is evident that 
it lacks legal tools to act effectively. It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the community will 
draw conclusion from this situation for the future and try to work out legal provisions pertaining to 
unconstitutional changes of government, echoing those adopted by the AU. 
 
6.2. Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s political crisis poses arguably one of the most severe concerns for the SADC. Roots of 
the crisis can be traced back to 2000, when incumbent Robert Mugabe lost the constitutional 
referendum, which epitomized a beginning of a gradual decline of support for the president 
(Cawthra, 2010, p. 24; du Plessis & Ford, 2008, p. 2). Subsequent parliamentary elections held in 
June 2000, presidential in March 2002, local in 2003 and 2004, and again parliamentary elections in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
46 Two main inconsistencies in the SADC’s Policy toward Madagascar over time include the change of the community’s 
stance pertaining unconditional reinstating of president Ravalomanana and evident exclusion of the two former 
presidents, Ratsiraka and Zafy, from meeting in July 2012.   
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2005 were all characterized by irregularities and to different extents were marked by violence and 
intimidation (ibid.) from the side of the ruling party - ZANU PF - directed mostly at supporters of 
Mugabe’s opposition – Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai.47  
  
The SADC was concerned about the crisis’ spill over effect in the region and became involved in the 
mediation process in Zimbabwe already in 2001 by appointment of Thabo Mbeki – then president 
of South Africa – as a mediator (Cawthra, 2010, p. 24). He was, however, recognized as an official 
mediator in the Zimbabwean case by the international community only in March 2007 (ibid., p. 25). 
The manner of the negotiations led by Mbeki, known as ‘quiet diplomacy’ quickly came under harsh 
criticism from many international organizations, non-governmental organizations (mainly human 
rights organizations), as well as most Western governments (with Britain at the forefront). 
Particularly preparations for the run-off of presidential elections in 2008 and thereafter were 
criticized (Siddique, 2008).  Main accusations pertained to the reluctance of Mbeki and the SADC to 
voice open criticism toward President Robert Mugabe’s regime, being lenient towards the despot, 
shielding him from international criticism, and opting for the removal of Western sanctions. The 
justification for the choice of this method of diplomacy by the SADC (or rather by South Africa, as 
the mediations started to be perceived very quickly as led by South Africa and not the community as 
a whole (Dzinesa & Zambara, 2011, p. 67) is manifold. 
 
First of all, one can point out historical relations between the two countries (and more generally in 
the region) pertaining to shared colonial experience and struggle for independence, which gave birth 
to the feeling of solidarity and reluctance to criticize each other. As Hamill and Hoffman emphasize, 
“no liberation movement taking power in Southern Africa after an armed struggle has ever lost 
                                                          
47 As Gavin Cawthra points out, despite the fact that SADC adopted in 2004 its principles and guidelines governing 
democratic elections and that 2005 elections were considerably flawed, the community still announced them to be free 
and fair (ibid. p. 25). 
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office” (2009, pp. 380). Historical experiences of ex-colonial states are also the reasons of strong 
anti-western sentiments encapsulated in the notion of neo-colonialism. The fast economic growth 
and development of South Africa, as well as its recognition as such at the international arena, have 
strengthened its links with Western powers. It has also influenced the perception of South Africa as 
an important military player on the continent. Against this backdrop, South Africa, does not want to 
be perceived as being a puppet of Western imperial powers or a regional hegemon which resorts to 
power in order to accomplish narrow political goals needed to act very carefully. Therefore, Mbeki’s 
via media of how to address regional problems and - as he wished it to be – efficiently, was mirrored 
in his policy of “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe. Jacob Zuma, who replaced Mbeki as a 
negotiator in 2009, also preferred quiet diplomacy as a mode of negotiations conduct, however, he 
has turned out to be more decisive and critical toward the regime. 
 
The main goal of Mbeki’s mediations in 2007 was to ensure that the presidential, parliamentary and 
local elections in 2008 ware all-inclusive and lock-in the democratic spirit without recourse to 
violence and manipulations of elections (Dzinesa & Zambara, 2011, p. 64). As a result, the 
presidential elections which took place in March 2008 were declared to be more free and fair and the 
process leading to the elections more accountable and transparent (Cawthra, 2010, p. 25). That was 
only a fleeting success however, as the release of election results were withheld for five weeks, 
causing much speculations about possible manipulation of the result. As neither Mugabe nor 
Tsvangirai won a majority of votes, a run-off was scheduled to take place in June (Cawthra, 2010, p. 
25). What followed was a wave of repressions and violence. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum argued that the scale of crimes committed during the first phase of elections and after the 
run-off, could be qualified as even crimes against humanity (2008, p. 15). As a result of repressions, 
the leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, resigned from participating in the run-off and Mugabe 
was elected for the next tenure.  
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The SADC Organ Troika preceding the run-off issued a statement advising the postponement of 
the elections, stating in diplomatic language that “[t]he Organ Summit feels strongly that because of 
the current charged atmosphere the parties and people of Zimbabwe deserve a cooling off period” 
(SADC Troika Communiqué, 2008). The attitude of the community toward Zimbabwe, in spite of 
not becoming extremely critical, slightly changed. Moreover, as Cawthra noticed “[t]he previously 
apparently united position of SADC began to show cracks, with Botswana and Zambia breaking 
ranks and condemning the conduct of the elections” (2010, p. 26).  
 
Nonetheless, while Mbeki’s conduct of negotiations was widely criticized, the community has to be 
given acknowledgement for successfully negotiating Global Political Agreement (GPA) (September 
2008). This subsequently led to the establishment of the Inclusive Government (IG) a year later, 
which someway stabilized the situation in Zimbabwe. Mugabe retained the presidency, while 
Tsvangirai was appointed as prime minister. GPA not only provided for power sharing between 
main political parties in Zimbabwe, but it also foresaw adoption of the new constitution.48 As it 
came to be, the process of drafting the new constitutions has been protracted and marked by many 
disputes, as the parties struggle to reach consensus. Four years on from the GPA’s adoption, the 
whole process is still far from being accomplished. The harmonized elections, in turn, are 
preliminarily scheduled for March 31, 2013 (Anonymous, 2012e). However, as this decision was 
taken unilaterally by Mugabe to general discontent of civil society and opposition party (Bell, 2012; 
Anonymous, 2012f), it is most probable that they will be postponed. The SADC has not yet voiced 
its opinion, but most probably it will urge the parties to adopt a new constitution first, and postpone 
elections until a conductive environment for elections is achieved.  
 
                                                          
48 Full text of the Global Political Agreement can be accessed from the official web page of  Zimbabwe Constitution 
Select Committee (COPAC). 
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The SADC’s involvement in the search for a peaceful solution to the Zimbabwean conflict has been 
assessed critically by most observers. Above all, the international community wished the community 
to be more critical and decisive when dealing with the Zimbabwean regime. When the conflict 
started to evolve and serious violations of human rights were reported, the community for a long 
time remained muted. Furthermore, it has been five years since the SADC was officially involved in 
the mediation process (in fact, Mbeki fulfilled this role unofficially even before 2007), but the 
conflict has not been resolved yet. Moreover, it seems to have been a mistake of the community to 
appoint representatives of the individual country to mediate (Zuma and Mbeki), instead of creating a 
mediation team, which would be perceived as more impartial. In fact, both facilitators were 
perceived in Zimbabwe as pro-ZANU-PF. Finally, Dzinesa and Zambara are of the opinion that 
“the main mistake SADC made was that it did not establish impartial structures to effectively 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the GPA” (2011, p. 64). Instead, this function was 
ascribed to the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) consisting of members 
of ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M. As the authors aptly grasp, this led to the situation where 
“three political parties [are] both the players and referees” (Dzinesa & Zambara, 2011, p. 65) with no 
external control from the SADC or civil society groups. Arguably, the main deficiency of the 
community in solving the Zimbabwean conflict (but also any other), is its government-centered 
decision making and structure. If the heads of state and government would be willing to cede their 
powers to groups of experts, many of the problems discussed in this subchapter may not have 
happened. 
 
Notwithstanding above, the SADC can also be given some credit and acknowledgement for its 
ability to negotiate the GPA which led to the establishment of the IG. While the IG is still criticized 
as being only a marriage of convenience, one may risk saying that without the SADC’s intervention 
the situation in Zimbabwe could have transformed into a full-blown civil war.  
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6.3. Swaziland 
While the situation in the Kingdom of Swaziland is substantially different to that in Madagascar or 
Zimbabwe, with no full-blown conflict taking place at the moment, one can certainly talk about a 
disturbing escalation of governance and constitutional crises in the country. Against the background 
of a political, economic and security situation considerably deteriorating within the borders of 
Swaziland, which is to be discussed shortly in this subchapter, it is informative for this study to 
analyze the responses (or lack of it) of the SADC to this evolving crisis and look at the measures 
which the community has in hand to sustainably stabilize the situation and bring the country on the 
more even keel.  
 
Swaziland is the smallest of the SADC’s states and is deeply dependent economically on its neighbor 
South Africa. It is also the last absolute monarchy on the African continent. The country has 
plunged in severe financial crisis for already two years and the risk of bankruptcy is very real (De 
Los Fayos, 2012). Estimates indicate that 40% of Swaziland’s population remain unemployed (CIA, 
2012) and 80% of the population live with less than 2$ per day (HRW, 2012, p. 186). At the same 
time, a lavish life-style of the king and his many wives is not unknown to his subjects. Moreover, the 
country has the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS amounting to 25,9% which significantly 
influences life expectancy (49,4 years) and maternal and infant mortality rates with 320 deaths/100 
000 live births and 59.57 deaths/1,000 live births respectively (ibid.).  
 
Swaziland cannot take pride in its human rights records either. Human rights violations amount to 
restrictions pertaining to freedom of media (self-censorship of media is prevalent); freedom of 
assembly such as political gatherings and peaceful demonstrations; arbitrary arrests, detentions and 
tortures of those protesting against inefficient management of the country, nepotism or poverty; 
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police harassment; widespread surveillance of political opposition and civil society organizations; as 
well as lack of judicial system impartiality (HRW, 2012, pp. 186-189).  
 
Swaziland, despite calling itself a democratic country49, lacks basic characteristics that commonly 
define democratic regimes. First of all, the political system50 of Swaziland is characterized by 
nepotism, as the country is “in fact governed by a relatively small elite, either belonging to the 
extensive royal family or traditionally connected with it through tribal leaders or others” (De Los 
Fayos, 2012, pp. 4-5). Secondly, while the country holds regular elections, the tinkhundla system 
through which it is exercised is widely criticized as not meeting the requirements of impartiality, 
transparency, and accountability. Dimpho Motsamai specified that deficiencies of tinkhundla system 
pertain to inter alia: the fact that existence of political parties rely solely on the King who favors pro-
regime parties and bans those which are critical towards it; screening of candidates to ensure they are 
pro-regime; or lack of guarantee of anonymity to voters (as it was the case in 2008). The system in 
general favors the incumbents (2012, pp. 6-7). All this amounts to a practical inability of citizens to 
change their government through the election process based on the tinkhundla model. Motsamai 
cynically but accurately defines this system of elections as ‘organized certainty’, stating that “they 
reproduce the prevailing political status quo” (ibid., p. 2). Moreover, the author emphasizes that 
elections in Swaziland are less about competition on access to decision-making structures, but rather 
over access to resources (ibid.). Thirdly, according to the new constitution from 2005, the King holds 
a wide array of powers which he does not hesitate to exercise:  
 
                                                          
49 Constitution of Swaziland begins with the statement: “Swaziland is a unitary, sovereign, democratic Kingdom.” 
50 Swaziland’s political system provides for parliament which comprises the Lower House (House of Assembly) and the 
Upper House (Senate). While the first one is elected – 55 members are chosen through tinkhundla system and 10 by 
the king – the second one is appointed by the House of Assembly (10 members) and the king (20) (Motsamai., 2012, 
p.3). 
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“Constitutional provisions allow King Mswati to select the cabinet, two-thirds of 
the senate, ten of 65 members of the House of Assembly, many senior civil 
servants, the chief justice and other justices of the superior courts, members of 
commissions established by the constitution, and the heads of government 
offices. Legislation passed by parliament requires the king’s consent to become 
law.” (Motsamai, 2012, p. 3). 
 
The King also enjoys the right of veto - he can ban any legislation he dislikes which was approved 
by the parliament.  
 
The status of the King and his cabinet has been confirmed as difficult to challenge, if not 
impossible, by the recent developments in the Kingdom. On October 3, 2012 the House of 
Assembly passed a motion of no confidence toward the cabinet - a historical moment if one takes 
into account that parliament has never stood up against the King or cabinet, but rather compliantly 
approved their decisions. According to the constitution, the King is obliged to immediately dissolve 
the cabinet and sack the Prime Minister (Lee, 2012b). Mswati did not comply with his constitutional 
obligations however, and the government did not decide to resign in an honorable way (Rooney, 
2012a; Phakathi, 2012). In fact, this epitomizes the undemocratic character of the country’s political 
system, as the King refused to act according to people’s will and constitution, favoring the elite that 
rules Swaziland. The recent upsurge of the Swazi House of Assembly has been, however, quickly 
extinguished: on October 15, the motion of no confidence was rescinded by 32 out of 65 members 
of the Lower House (Rooney, 2012b). While the whole situation may not change the status quo of 
the Swaziland’s political system, it surely put the country again in the limelight of international media 
and may renew international actors’ commitment to seek democratization in the little Kingdom.   
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As the crisis does not have potential for very disastrous spill-over effects that could affect 
neighboring states due to Swaziland’s size and economic irrelevance51, the ongoing 2 years-long 
crisis did not attract much attention of international actors. The SADC, which in its treaty and 
protocols embraces values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, transparency and 
sustainable economic development, remains remarkably muted on deviant practices of democracy in 
Swaziland. On the one hand, one may argue that the situation in Swaziland does not fulfill criteria 
that would automatically compel the SADC to seek to resolve the crisis.52  
 
On the other hand, the SADC does not enjoy a good reputation concerning its preventive 
diplomacy, as some scholars, among them Motsamai, point out: “[so far] subsidiarity in the SADC 
region has proved to be a limiting principle that protects regimes rather than populations” 
(Motamai, 2012, p. 11). If the SADC wants to regain its position and prove that it is serious about 
norms, values and principles which figure on the community’s documents, it cannot continue its ‘do 
nothing’ policy. Besides, the Swazi civil society becomes slowly impatient with the regime (both its 
political and economic side), therefore one might expect that the crisis will escalate. Additionally, 
elections scheduled for 2013 will certainly increase those tensions. This alone, should give the SADC 
a red light. 
 
South Africa tried to use a ‘carrot and a stick’ policy by offering Swaziland a bailout in exchange for 
democratic reform in the country, but negotiations allegedly came to a deadlock (ibid., p.2). 
However, as the Zimbabwean story proves, politics carried out by the SADC through only one of its 
members might turn out to bring more troubles than profits. The SADC cannot for much longer 
                                                          
51 Swaziland’s economy, however, is deeply interconnected with that of South Africa (Motsamai, 2012, p. 2). 
52 SADC is eligible to act in case of ‘significant intra-state conflict’ which encompass: “(i) large-scale violence between 
sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing 
and gross violation of human rights; (ii) a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State; (iii) a 
condition of civil war or insurgency; and (iv) a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the 
territory of another State Party” ([Art..11(2b)], 2001, SADC). 
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ignore irregularities in Swaziland. It should seek for an opportunity to diplomatically mediate 
graduate democratization, starting with a sending consultative mission for instance. Motsamai 
emphasizes that diplomacy is the best option for the community to engage in solving the crisis, as its 
legal instruments are mostly not binding on member states and there are no punitive measures for 
states which breach the SADC’s rules (2012, p. 12). The answer to the situation in Swaziland will 
clearly test the community’s real attachment to its own values and principles and its true willingness 
to boost human security in the region.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The main objective of this thesis was to provide a re-assessment of the effectiveness and the level of 
development of the SADC’s peace and security architecture as well as its proceedings and capability 
to ensure a secure environment in its region. More specifically, the paper aimed at determining the 
main achievements and deficiencies of the SADC’s security architecture in assuring security and a 
stable peace. To this end, the study was guided by four research questions which intended to identify 
the level of institutional development of the community’s peace and security architecture; determine 
the main factors that limit intended integration in this area; analyze the SADC’s responses to the 
conflicts, crises and other instabilities taking place in the region; and finally, determine whether 
regional integration channeled through the SADC’s security cooperation brought the community 
any closer to the intended final level of integration – attainment of security community status. 
 
In order to deal with the first research question – which addresses the level of institutional 
development of the SADC’s frameworks and mechanisms which aim at prevention and solution of 
both inter and intra state conflicts, promotion of the community’s values and fostering human rights 
- the study analyzed the state of development, implementation, and operationalization of the 
community’s various documents and institutions related to security (Chapter Five). While the overall 
level of the SADC’s institutional development seems to be impressive at first glance, the research 
revealed that some of its instruments must still be fully operationalized (EWS which fulfils conflict 
preventive mechanism being the best example). The main deficiency of the SADC’s peace and 
security architecture is its low level of civil society engagement. The in-depth analysis reveals yet 
another characteristic of the community: it is heavily government-based, as the whole decision-
making process lies solely in hands of heads of states and government, as well as various ministers 
from member states. The lack of strong secretariat generally, and the fact that the Organ does not 
have a separate secretariat but all services are provided through the SADC Secretariat which is 
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already overburdened and under resourced, further inhibits effectiveness of its security architecture. 
Finally, the SADC in many aspects lacks enforcement mechanisms (as the case of debilitated SADC 
Tribunal). Moreover, the non-binding status of the community’s crucial documents (for instance the 
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections) leaves their observance voluntary for 
the SADC member states. 
 
All this leads to the second research question, which addresses factors limiting effectiveness of the 
SADC’s peace and security architecture. First of all, as is evident, the effectiveness of the 
architecture is severely constrained by the inter-governmental structure of the community. Bearing 
in mind that the SADC encompasses several states which cannot be considered as democratic, it is 
rather naïve to expect that the intern-governmental SADC will be able and willing to enforce 
democratization process upon its member states or truly embrace human rights. This is the case 
especially as all decisions at the Summit level shall be taken by consensus, therefore each leader has 
the right to veto decisions which are in opposition to their interest. This turns out to be a significant 
problem of the SADC’s effectiveness in providing human security to people in the region, as those 
who are supposed to be guards of the very principles, norms, and values of the community are not 
infrequently responsible for their violations. In addition, the notion of solidarity among regional 
leaders prevents the SADC’s decision-makers from taking more decisive stands against each others. 
Another factor that limits security integration relates to the capacity of the SADC’s member states to 
finance its undertakings. While the ambitions of the community are laudable, in many instances 
establishment of the anticipated structures is lagging behind, as it does not have the financial 
capacity to erect the mechanisms it envisioned within the time-frameworks it imposed upon itself. 
Finally, the reluctance of the community to use those few punitive measures, that the SADC had 
envisaged in its documents against members who do not comply with the community principles, 
significantly weakens its performance and leaves the community toothless. 
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The SADC’s responses to conflicts and crises, which are at the center of interest of the third 
research question, have been analyzed in Chapter Six. While engagement of the community in the 
conflicts in Madagascar and Zimbabwe are commendable, their effectiveness is questionable. The 
mode of negotiations in both cases suffered from serious limitations. Not once did agreements 
facilitated by the SADC not become upheld or fully ignored by the parties to the conflict. Moreover, 
the appointment of individual negotiators by the community gives rise to many suspicions about the 
negotiators’ impartiality. Therefore, the development of a well-functioning Mediation Unit should 
remain a priority for the community. Little indicates that elections in Zimbabwe (March 2013) and 
Madagascar (May 2013) will be conducted in a peaceful environment and in a spirit of democracy. In 
addition, inaction by the community in case of Swaziland severely undermines the SADC’s 
commitment to its own principles and its credibility on the international arena. While the SADC has 
at its own disposition a nearly fully-fledged peace and security architecture, it still needs to work out 
modes of effective deployment. Nonetheless, in spite of so far unsuccessful efforts of the 
community to solve regional conflicts, the community still needs to be given a lot of recognition for 
its ability to develop one of the most advanced security architectures in the African continent. 
 
Finally, the last question posed in this paper ponders whether the SADC exhibits any characteristics 
which could indicate that the organization’s member states converge into being a pluralistic security 
community. As has been established in this research, the SADC’s objectives and principles have a 
potential to guide the organization toward becoming a security community, which is the desired 
direction in which the SADC intends to proceed. An answer to this question is however rather 
complex. According to Adler and Barnet’s conceptual framework, the SADC has attained at the very 
least the level of integration described by the scholars as a nascent security community, as the states 
of the region recognized the benefits stemming from cooperation, have expressed their intention to 
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cooperate, and started to develop comprehensive strategies to enhance it. In a similar vein, 
cooperation in the areas relating to security, as it is the case with the SADC, has been always the 
most delicate and confidential element of each state’s politics. Therefore, this epitomizes the 
significant level of mutual trust among actors. The second phase of emergence of a security 
community assumes intensification of communication and cooperation, which takes place not only 
at governments’ and states’ elites, but also encompasses civil society actors. As has been exhibited in 
this thesis, the SADC is still mainly an intergovernmental organization with only little involvement 
from the side of civil society. One of the most important features of a fully developed security 
community is its ability to solve emerging conflicts in other ways than militarily. The empirical 
evidence bears testimony that full-blown inter-state conflicts have been absent in the region since 
the organization’s establishment. However, the states of the region still use the military threat against 
one another – with Malawi and Tanzania the latest examples - to attain their political goals. 
Nonetheless, the main obstacle to the SADC in transforming itself into a security community is its 
failure to foster human security in the region. On many occasions the organization has proved that it 
places regime security above human security. Critically, the SADC’s failure to uphold its own 
principles connected with promotion of democracy, human rights and legitimate state institutions, 
hinders the potential of the community to becoming a fully developed security community. Despite 
this conclusion, it should not be overlooked that due to the combined efforts of regional leaders, the 
SADC has managed to establish an institutional framework, which if given proper direction, might 
facilitate the organization’s transformation into a mature security community in the future.  
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